Elihu continued and said:

“Bear with me a little, and I will show you, for I have yet something to say on God’s behalf.”

—Job 36:1-2 (NRSV)
Another Exception to *Granville Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*

A Further Response to Dan Wallace
(With an Appendix)

Greg Stafford**

The Greek grammatical rule known most commonly today as “Sharp’s rule” was actually one of several rules proposed by Englishman and author Granville Sharp in his 1798 publication, *Remarks on the Use of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament: Containing Many New Proofs of the Divinity of Christ, from Passages Which are Wrongly Translated in the Common English Version.*

The most popular of Sharp’s “rules” is his “Rule I.” While those familiar with Sharp’s work often credit him alone for this rule in relation to certain christologically significant texts in the New Testament (NT), there is still some question about whether it is truly Granville Sharp who is to be credited for its first use in relation to many of the same NT texts involving “God” and “Christ.” In any case, the purposes of the present paper are primarily to review some of the

---

* This article was revised most recently on January 30, 2012. It was originally released on July 16, 2010, apart from the *Elihu Online Papers* series, but as a draft intended to eventually be revised and included as the second *Elihu Online Paper*. It was, in fact, revised on January 18, 2011, and then included in the EOP series. Since then, and in preparation for my pending book, *The “Sharpest Rule”: A Review and Restatement of Greek’s Most Tragic Rule*, I have been able to review the reading of what was previously given in this paper as “another exception” to Granville “Sharp’s rule” and to Daniel B. Wallace’s “Sharper rule.” However, due to a transcription error on my part when copying the text from the article written by David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria in Five Letters of Isidore of Pelusium,” *Earle Hilgert Festschrift: The Studia Philonica Annual 3* (1991), pages 299, 301, in which the Greek text for Isidore is provided, even though I presented the text accurately in earlier versions of this paper I was working from personal notes in which I had written ὁ θεός καὶ κύριος. After checking the text against Migne in preparation for *The “Sharpest Rule,”* I was able to find out my own mistake. Therefore, no longer will I cite Isidore of Pelusium, *Ep. 2.143 (= Ep. 643 [Évieux])* as an example of an exception to “Sharp’s rule” or to the “ Sharper rule.” In its place, both as “another exception” in the sense of one not usually brought up, indeed, one never before brought up as a defined exception to Sharp’s rule since my 2000 Excursus. That exception is from Justin Martyr, namely, *Dialogue with Trypho*, 110.55 (cited and discussed on page 24).

** Greg Stafford operates Elihu Books, a book, video, and audio publishing company related to the educational and ministerial activities of Christian Witnesses of Jah around the world. For more on Stafford’s activities and writings, see the menu links at http://www.elihubooks.com.

1 Though the title of Sharp’s work is in all capital letters in my version, given its length I have rendered the title as above so it is easier to read. I am using my copy of the first American edition published in Philadelphia by B.B. Hopkins in 1807. This is the same edition which I used in my two previous writings on the subject of Sharp’s rule (see my *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended: An Answer to Scholars and Critics*, First [1998] and Second [2000] Editions published by Elihu Books, pages 221-248 and pages 367-410, respectively).

2 In Wallace’s treatments of this subject he notes that while Sharp’s first published edition of his first rule was in 1798, the 1798 publication contains Sharp’s claim to have earlier produced the first 24 pages in a letter to “an

Sharp’s usual practice was to make an ἀντίγραφον [antigraphon, “copy”) of his letters. On this occasion, however, Sharp “had not leisure to copy the original letter” and, after repeated attempts to retrieve it over a span of several years, was able to obtain only a part of it. [Wallace, Granville Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 48, note 76; underlining added.]

At the end of his above quoted comments Wallace refers to page 24 of Sharp’s published Remarks, on which page there is the following final paragraph by “G. S.” (Granville Sharp), originally all in italics:

The remainder of this letter is lost. The author [Granville Sharp] had not leisure to copy the original letter before he sent it to the gentlemen to whom it was addressed, and therefore he requested him to return it as soon as he had perused and considered it; but the gentleman neglected this request; and the author [Granville Sharp], after several years’ solicitation, obtained only a part of the letter, (as far as is here copied,) and the remainder (which was written on a separate half-sheet) he has never yet been able to recover. He had however a short memorandum of the several texts, which were explained in the latter part of the letter; and, having since had favourable opportunities of examining the said texts, and of copying them very accurately from the ancient Alexandrian manuscript in the British Museum, he has been enabled to make some short remarks on the versions of all of the said texts, which may serve as a sufficient Supplement to this imperfect letter. Some notes have been added to this printed copy which were not in the original letter.

From Sharp to Wallace, this all sounds very strange where it concerns the true origin of Sharp’s “Rule I.” Indeed, Sharp himself is unable to account for the originality of his letter dated June 10, 1778, in ways which are suspicious at best. While it is possible Sharp’s account of his original, now lost “rules” is correct, there is also the very real possibility that Sharp was not the first one to put forth a rule like his now famous “Rule I.” According to John Pye Smith (1774-1851) who, like Sharp, was for good reasons an anti-slavery advocate as well as the “son of a Sheffield bookseller, ... surrounded by books in his youth and, practically self-taught, [who] rose not only to become a dissenting academic and, through his interest in science and geology, was elected to become the first Fellow of the Royal Society from a nonconformist background” (from the online article, “John Pye-Smith” located at http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/4208084, last accessed on January 29, 2012), it was Utrecht Professor of Divinity Dr. Royaards (in his Divinitate Iesu Christi Vera) who first published the following three rules as early as 1792 (see my further review of Royaard’s “rules” in my forthcoming, The “Sharpest” Rule):

Where designations of God and Christ occur, united by the copulative conjunction, they must be understood of two persons when the article is prefixed to both; they may be understood of two when the article is prefixed to neither: but, when the article is prefixed to the first and not repeated before the second, they must be referred to one and the same person. This is the constant usage of the New Testament writers. J.P. Smith, The Scripture Testimony to the Messiah: An Inquiry With a View to a Satisfactory Determination of the Doctrine Taught in the Holy Scriptures Concerning the Person of Christ, vol. III, Second Edition (London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1829), page 344.]

While not the same as Sharp’s “Rule I,” the last stated “rule” does similarly pertain to many of the same texts. That is why at the end of his recitation of Royaards’ rules Smith has a note in which he refers to “Royaards Diatribe de Div. Jesu Chr. par. ii. p. 154,” as his source, noting further, “It is to be observed that this brief but valuable work was published several years before Mr. Sharp’s Letters” (underlining added). However, it may also be the case that Sharp sent out some earlier version of his “Rule I,” which was in his opinion insufficient to publish, but which was not much at all like what became his “Rule I.” Indeed, by Sharp’s own recounting of what he “had written on the same subject” to his unnamed “friend,” Sharp was not comfortable enough to send out his earlier letter to anyone else until his unnamed “friend” wrote in response for, as Sharp put it, “lest it [the answer from Sharp’s unnamed ‘friend’] should oblige me to make any alterations in my rules; and so, indeed, it had proved; for, he objected to my first rule, (as it was then stated,) and has cited several exceptions to it” (Sharp, Remarks, pages 1-2; underlining added). Therefore, what Sharp sent out before his published Remarks was by his own admission not the same as the
history involved in the discussion, presentation, and use of Sharp’s first rule, as well as to present a clearer listing of some of the existing (known) exceptions and to present yet another exception which I first introduced back in 2000, that is, another exception in addition to what had previously been cited by others in response to Sharp’s rule. Therefore, first I will cite Sharp’s “Rule I.):

When two personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative καὶ (“and”), if the former has the definitive article, and the latter has not, they both relate to the same person, ... Page 3.³

This rule, as quoted above and according to its larger form in note 3, was given its first exceptions by none other than Granville Sharp in the very same publication in which he first presented his rules. According to Sharp:

[T]here is no exception or instance of the like mode of expression, that I know of, which necessarily requires a construction different from what is here laid down, EXCEPT the nouns be proper names, or in the plural number; in which cases there are many exceptions;⁴

Since Sharp’s Remarks what is and what is not an “exception” to what has come to be known as his rule continues to create questions with few complete or even credible answers in return, with the result that over two hundred years later there is still great confusion when it comes to this subject. Among Trinitarians Wallace has noted misrepresentations of Sharp’s rule in the grammars and works of A.T. Robertson, H.E. Dana and J.R. Mantey, and Kenneth Wuest.⁵ More
recently, several non-Trinitarian works have misused or misstated (or both) Sharp’s rule. Even in earlier versions of this paper I have cited at least one example by mistake (see note *, page 1), though I have also corrected my mistake and revised this paper with what is truly another exception to Sharp’s rule and to Wallace’s “Sharper rule,” though this exception is not entirely new but one which has I found and cited in my 2000 Excursus and with this paper choose to highlight among all the other known and, in many cases, widely accepted exceptions.

It seems reasonably clear also that part of the problem with the continued misunderstanding of Sharp’s rule is due to Sharp’s own lack of clarity in several respects. For example, the formal statements of Sharp’s “Rule I.” do not include all of the limitations which Sharp put upon his rule in the body of his Remarks. Even when such further limitations are placed on the rule by Sharp in his publication, they are not always clear (compare Gregory Blunt’s complaint, quoted in my note 11).

6 Two relatively recent misrepresentations of Sharp’s rule are connected with the publications of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society. The first involves the Watchtower Society’s own 1984 New World Translation (NWT) Reference Bible (Brooklyn: New York) and its 1966 and 1985 Kingdom Interlinear Translations (KIT). Though the Watchtower Society also provided an appendix discussing Titus 2:13 in its 1969 KIT (see page 1163) and in its 1950 NWT New Testament (see pages 783-785), only the NWT1984 (see Appendix 6E, pages 1581-1582) and the KIT1985 (see Appendix 2E, pages 1143-1144) reference and discuss the article written in 1881 by Ezra Abbot, “On the Construction of Titus ii. 13,” JBL 1, pages 3-19. While Abbot’s article is excellent in many ways, as I have shown previously in my citation and use of his article (see my Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended, First Edition, pages 229, 238-241, 243; Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended, Second Edition, pages 377-378, 387, 389, 398, 401), Abbot does mistakenly include plural nouns as examples of exceptions to Sharp’s rule in texts such as Matthew 21:12, where we read of “those selling and those buying” (τοὺς πωλῶντας καὶ ἀγοράζοντας). It should be kept in mind, however, Abbot does not appear to cite this text as an absolute exception to Sharp’s rule, but only to further illustrate how, at times, in both Greek and in English an article may be omitted from one noun versus another (whether they are plural or singular), that is, when “it is safely left to the intelligence of the reader to distinguish them” (Abbot, “On the Construction of Titus ii. 13,” page 14). But the Watchtower Society’s highlighting and use of Abbot’s remarks on the plural nouns in Matthew 21:12 over several decades has contributed to the misunderstanding about plural nouns and “Sharp’s rule.” Many other sections of Abbot’s article could have been used in place of Abbot’s illustrative use and comments on Matthew 21:12. Similarly, Jason David BeDuhn, Truth in Translation: Accuracy and Bias in English Translations of the New Testament (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2003), page 91, cites Titus 1:4 as “the closest parallel to Titus 2:13.” But it is not the closest parallel, and it is not even a close parallel in terms of its syntax. As an instance or use involving “Savior,” Titus 1:4 is relevant to the use of the same term in Titus 2:13. But BeDuhn’s citation of 2 Thessalonians 1:12 is closer (even, perhaps, “the closest”) parallel to texts such as Titus 2:13, since it contains similar nouns and an explicitly named subject (“Jesus”) in a “Sharp’s rule” construction. BeDuhn also does not explain the full significance of these and other parallels. He refers only to Wallace’s 1983 article from Grace Theological Journal (referenced more fully in my note 8), and BeDuhn badly misstates Sharp’s rule on page 92 of his book as follows:

Those who defend the translations that read as if only Jesus is spoken of in both Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1 attempt to distinguish those two passages from the parallel examples I have given by something called “Sharp’s Rule.” In 1798, the amateur theologian Granville Sharp published a book in which he argued that when there are two nouns of the same form (“case”) joined by “and” (καί), only the first of which has the article, the nouns are identified as the same thing. Close examination of this much-used “rule” shows it to be a fiction concocted by a man who had a theological agenda in creating it, namely, to prove that the verses we are examining in this chapter call Jesus “God” [BeDuhn, Truth in Translation, page 92].

BeDuhn has not rightly represented Sharp or his rule in the above quotation. Indeed, BeDuhn (Truth in Translation, page 93) even uses Wallace’s 1983 article on plural nouns in the Sharp construction to support his claim that “there is no evidence that anything significant for the meaning of the words happens merely by being joined by ‘and’ and dropping the second article”! Neither Wallace’s 1983 article nor his writings since then provide any evidence for BeDuhn’s claims here. Unfortunately, BeDuhn has misread both Sharp and Wallace on this matter and, together with the NWT/KIT’s misuse of Abbot’s article, many non-Trinitarians have been misinformed when it comes to the definition and the application of Sharp’s rule to certain texts. As noted previously, this is also true of many Trinitarian works which are often otherwise useful or credible references.
Wallace claims on page 120 of Sharp’s *Remarks* that Sharp “explicitly” states “impersonal constructions are within the purview of his second, third, fifth, and sixth rules, but not the first.”

Yet, eleven (11) years earlier in 1983 Wallace published the following:

Durham and Rider believe that Sharp did not exclude impersonal constructions. Although this point is ancillary to the subject of this paper, I believe that Durham and Rider have misread Sharp, for Sharp explicitly states that he accepts the impersonal constructions as fitting the second, third, fifth, and sixth rules, but not the first or fourth [referring to Sharp’s page 120].

The above demonstrates just how unclear Sharp was in formulating and presenting his rules, for in 1983 Wallace even misread Sharp’s page 120 to mean, “Sharp explicitly states that he accepts impersonal constructions as fitting … not the first or fourth” rules laid down by Sharp. In his 1995 doctoral dissertation and in his 2009 publication Wallace changed his reading of Sharp’s page 120 so that, as noted earlier, by 1995 Wallace was prepared only to read Sharp’s page 120 as not including impersonal constructions “within the purview of his … first” rule (underlining added); the reference to the “fourth” rule in Wallace’s 1983 article is omitted in Wallace’s 1995 dissertation and in his 2009 publication on this subject. Again, this is not to suggest such things cannot happen because of the nature of this subject; rather, it is to show how easily they can and have happened, even to those of us who have studied this subject intently for years.

The fact remains, Sharp did not clearly or expressly exclude impersonal nouns from his first rule and Sharp did not “explicitly” state on his page 120 that impersonal constructions do not fit the requirements of either his first or fourth rules, as Wallace previously claimed. Wallace’s 1983, 1995, and 2009 descriptions are not accurate when it comes to what Sharp wrote in his *Remarks*, page 120, since on that page Sharp says nothing about his first rule being inapplicable to impersonal nouns (though Sharp does reference his first rule briefly on his page 121, in connection with the exclusion of proper names).

However, since Sharp refers only to “personal” nouns in formal statements of his rule, Sharp does appear to have understood a limitation or exclusion for impersonal nouns from his first

---


9 Wallace’s 1995 and 2009 corrections to his 1983 article on this point are appropriate, since Sharp’s fourth rule (*Remarks [1807]*, page xxxvi) reads:

**RULE IV.**

*If the nouns are not personal, they relate to different things or qualities.*

10 Sharp quotes Gregory Blunt, *Six More Letters to Granville Sharp, Esq. on His Remarks upon the Uses of the Article in the Greek Testament* (London: J. Johnson, 1803), page 43, regarding Blunt’s claim, “many of the examples … in your second, third, and fifth rules, and the majority of those in the sixth, consist of nouns which are not personal.” Sharp then responds on his page 120 with references only to his “2d” and “3d rules,” and to his “fifth and sixth rules,” but not to his first or to his fourth rules.
rule.  But Sharp’s lack of clarity where it concerns the limitations of his rules can also be seen in his treatment of plural nouns. That is why in his 1983 article Wallace wrote the following about Sharp’s claims concerning plural constructions:

Sharp does not clearly state that his rule is applicable only in the singular. Such a conclusion may be at best only inferred via an argument from silence (i.e., in stating that “the latter always relates to the same person . . . i.e. it denotes a farther description of the first-named person,” Sharp only refers to the singular). However, a perusal of his monograph reveals that he insisted on the singular in order for the rule to apply absolutely.  

In addition to Sharp’s own accepted exceptions to his rule, which at the very least include impersonal nouns, proper nouns, and plural nouns, Wallace accepts the following as further exceptions to Sharp’s first “rule”:

1) **Generic Nouns:** Nouns (substantives) applied in a general or universal sense, that is, without any specific, singularly personal application of the noun.

   **Example:** Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1148a.

   τόν σωφρόνα καὶ ἀκόλαστον

   (“the disciplined and undisciplined [man]”).

---

11 According to Wallace (“Multiple Substantives,” pages 47-48) on pages 140-142 of his Remarks Sharp “chastises [Gregory] Blunt for bringing in impersonal constructions as exceptions to the rule.” While it is true Blunt used examples such as Luke 14:21 (involving plural, impersonal nouns [“broad ways” and “streets”]), part of the problem involves both a lack of clarity by Sharp on points of exclusion or limitation concerning his rule (such as for proper nouns and for plurals) which are not stated expressly as part of his Rule I. (or separately on page xxxv or page 3 of Sharp’s Remarks), as well as a lack of clarity by Sharp about why such nouns were excluded in the first place. Indeed, note Blunt’s complaint to Sharp on this point:

In proper names, perhaps, you may discover something which, at first sight, seems to afford ground for a particular distinction between them and other nouns. … but even this is no ground for a general limitation, or for making a difference between proper names, and all nouns descriptive of office, dignity, &c.; for of these latter, there are many which express diversity as strongly and as necessarily as any proper names whatever can possibly do. Thus, for instance, king and queen, husband and wife, &c. with all those which I mentioned in my former letter, and many more that might be mentioned, are as different as Sharp and Blunt. If, then, proper names are beyond the reach of your rule, because they, by their nature indicate diversity, so likewise must all such personal nouns as these, be, which, by their nature are equally indicative of diversity. Before, therefore, you can proscribe such examples as consist of proper names from being brought against your rule, you must reduce that rule to narrower limits, and confine its operation, not merely to personal nouns, but to personal nouns of one sort only. And then, in the next place, before you can apply your rule to the proposed correction of our common version in those texts you have selected, you must shew [sic] that χριστός [sic: “Christ”], κυρίος (“Lord”), and σωτήρ (“Savior”), as applied to Jesus, differ less widely from δ θεός (“the God” or “God”) and δ μεγάς θεός (“the great God”), then one proper name does from another. And when you have done this, it will then be a proper subject of inquiry, whether such a circumstance affords sufficient ground for maintaining that personal nouns, even of this sort, are differently affected by the article and by conjunction from proper names. [Blunt, *Six More Letters to Granville Sharp*, pages 40, 41-42; underlining added; italics original.]


Wallace quotes Winstanley’s insightful evaluation of his exceptions to Sharp’s rule from Aristotle, namely (as quoted by Wallace), “the nouns, though personal, are used in a general or universal sense.” Wallace then continues his quotation of Winstanley as follows: “In this respect, it must be confessed, they differ materially from those of which you [i.e., Sharp] would correct the common version; and so far may be thought inapplicable ...” Here is the full paragraph from Winstanley inclusive of the parts quoted by Wallace:

In all the above-cited passages from Aristotle, the nouns, though personal, are used in a general or universal sense. In this respect, it must be confessed, they differ materially from those of which you would correct the common version; and so far may be thought inapplicable to our present purpose. But they are not totally inapplicable; as they prove that when the signification of the nouns renders any farther precaution unnecessary, the second article may be omitted, without confounding the distinction of persons. They prove also that the article may be understood after the copulative; for the same author as frequently repeats it with similar nouns ... sometimes he omits it altogether, and in the same sense ...  

In fact, though Wallace omits a large part of Winstanley’s comments on these texts, and though he ignores Winstanley’s “signification of the nouns” argument (likely, as I will show later in this paper, because such a “signification” also impacts other examples of Sharp’s rule), Wallace concedes Winstanley’s exceptions “modify Sharp’s rule” so that both “nouns which are plural syntactically and those which are plural semantically (i.e., generic nouns) are not within the purview of the rule.”

2) **Enumeration:** The ‘stringing’ together of two, three, or more nouns (“multiple substantives”).


τὸν οἶνοχόν καὶ μάγειρον καὶ ἱππόκόμον καὶ διήκονον καὶ ἄγγελιηφόρον

(“the drink-bringer and the cook and the groom and the servant and the messenger”).

---

14 Winstanley, *Vindication*, page 9 (underlining added).

15 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 123; Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 123. Wallace, however, goes so far as to accept that these generic exceptions may cause him to “modify [Wallace’s] ‘head count’ within the NT” for Sharp’s rule constructions, which would eliminate 24 of the examples cited by Wallace in his Appendix to his 1995 dissertation (pages 283-289) and from Wallace’s 2009 publication (pages 287-301). *(Note: In his 1995 dissertation [see page 124, note 112] Wallace references “eighty constructions fitting Sharp’s rule” in the NT, though he numbers only “78” in his 1995 dissertation’s Appendix; in Wallace’s 2009 book on Sharp’s rule [see page 123, note 67] Wallace corrects this number to “seventy-nine,” matching his 2009 book’s Appendix.) But Wallace does not remove the 24 examples he acknowledges involve “generic substantives” from his NT tabulation(s) for reasons given in his 1995 dissertation on page 124, note 112, and in note 67 on page 123 of his 2009 *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, which reasons I will discuss further in my forthcoming “Sharpest Rule” publication, as the primary purposes of this paper involve a review of the different known exceptions to “Sharp’s rule,” responses to certain related issues, and to introduce yet another exception to *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin* that has not been taken seriously since my 2000 Excursus was published.*

16 Wallace defines “enumeration” as “instances in which three or more nouns are strung together” (“Multiple Substantives,” page 128; *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 127).

As Wallace put it, Bishop Thomas Fanshaw Middleton “had quite a bit of difficulty with” this text. So, too, has Wallace “had quite a bit of difficulty with” this text, I will argue. The reason is obvious, for as was stated by Winstanley in direct response to Middleton, “Surely, Dr. M. can never consider it as equally improbable that the same person should exercise five different offices.” So, then, the problem for Wallace, as it was for Middleton, is how to explain this text in relation to Sharp’s rule.

Ironically, what constitutes the first 8 words of Wallace’s 1995 doctoral dissertation also describe what Wallace admits “might” further refine Sharp’s rule, namely, “The Article with Multiple Substantives Connected by Καί.” Herodotus’ Histories 4.71 contains an obvious exception to Sharp’s rule, that is (to quote Wallace), “where several [or, ‘multiple’] nouns are involved in the construction.” Therefore, in light of Histories 4.71, Wallace writes “it may or may not follow the rule.”

Winstanley’s rejoinder to Middleton’s attempted use of enumeration before Wallace attempted also to use it still stands without a complete, credible response:

Lastly, the Dr. says, ‘it has subsequently occurred to him, that the several nouns μαγειρόν [‘cook’], ἱπποκόμοιν [‘groom’], &c. may want the article by’ what he calls ‘Enumeration.’ What power this has to extricate any passage from the operation of Mr. Sharp’s rule, we cannot see: but we can see that it is just as easy for Unitarians to call the disputed texts (Ephes. v. 5. Tit. ii. 13. &c) enumeration, as it is for the Dr. to call this passage of Herodotus by that name. Whether there be any thing more in the term than a mere name, our readers will have an opportunity of determining for themselves when we come to speak of the Doctor’s anomalies, of which enumeration makes one.

Instead of accepting without controversy that this example fits and excepts Sharp’s first rule, Wallace chooses to write in defense of Middleton’s concept of enumeration in relation to this text after first limiting Wallace’s concept of “enumeration” to “three or more nouns” (see note 16), followed by this explanation for Histories 4.71:

---


19 Winstanley, Vindication, Appendix, page 53.

20 Indeed, whether Wallace did so intentionally because of texts such as Histories 4.71 or primarily for some other reason, the title, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin at least does not carry with it a title concerning a Greek “rule” involving “multiple substantives connected by καί” which is so expressly contradicted by Herodotus!

21 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 130; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 128.

22 Winstanley, Vindication, Appendix, pages 53-54.

23 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 128, and Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 127, cites Middleton’s 1841 edition of The Doctrine of the Greek Article, pages 99-100, claiming that there Middleton “dealt with” this concept of “enumeration” involving “three or more nouns strung together.” According to Wallace, “in that section [on pages 99-100] Middleton noted that even the best authors did not follow their normal practice with reference to the article.” Yet, for Wallace, this is not supposed to be about “the article” before certain types of nouns, but about
“Sharp’s rule.” Winstanley already effectively answered Middleton on this point by noting (as quoted above from Vindication, Appendix, page 54), “it is just as easy for Unitarians to call [two of the disputed texts (Ephes. v. 5. Tit. ii. 13. &c) enumeration, as it is for the Dr. to call this passage of Herodotus by that name.” This may also be in part what motivated Wallace to question even the use of a second epithet, “in some respects,” as “really not required” (Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 128, note 126; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 127, note 83). Wallace largely ignores Winstanley’s reply on this point, deferring instead to Middleton’s and to two other grammarians’ discussion of “the phenomenon of enumeration”:

Middleton noted that even the best authors did not follow their normal practice with reference to the article. Other grammarians also point out the problem of enumeration, noting, in effect, that in lists of three or more terms, there is a greater tendency to omit the article when it would otherwise be appropriate [Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 128; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 127.]

Yet, in Middleton’s entire discussion of “Anomalies” (which begins on page 98 and ends page 101 of his 1841 edition) there is not even one example given which involves the “problem of enumeration” in a Sharp’s rule construction! Here is what Middleton illustrates in his chapter on “Anomalies”: 1) Nouns which otherwise might have the article prefixed to them “become anarthrous” when used after prepositions and so “their definiteness or indefiniteness must be determined on other grounds” (pages 98-99); 2) “where several Nouns are coupled together by Conjunctions” or where “the Conjunctions are omitted” but where “the nouns would, if they stood singly, require the Article, yet when thus brought together, they very frequently reject it” (which Middleton here calls “Enumeration” on his page 99, and which Middleton also applies on his page 100 to “where there are only two” [underlining added] nouns, just as we have in most of Sharp’s and Wallace’s examples!); 3) “in a series of things of the same class only one can be first, one second, … Ordinals [= a number which is a part of a series of numbers], however, for the most part, whether the Nouns, with which they agree, be expressed or understood, are anarthrous” (page 100). Middleton then gives the following note:

It is not meant, that this practice, any more than the preceding, is without exception: Ordinals not unfrequently [sic] take the Article. The reason of the irregularity seems to be, that while their natural definiteness gives them a right to the Article, it at the same time renders the Article unnecessary. [Middleton, The Doctrine of the Greek Article, page 100; underlining added.]

This is also what we have in other texts with other nouns’ “natural definiteness” at times ‘rendering the article unnecessary.’ Middleton concludes his discussion of “Anomalies” by 4) “superlatives” such as “first” and “last” which have “so close an affinity to the Ordinals” that they “also sometimes reject the Article.” Yet, again, not one of the anomalous uses of the Greek article in Middleton’s discussion is illustrated in a Sharp’s rule construction. Indeed, as Wallace appears to concede when it comes to texts such as Histories 4.71, it is often more or equally a question of the usage of the substantive with or without the article and any “natural definiteness” such nouns otherwise may have as a result of their use for persons in article-substantive-καί-substantive constructions than it is about the syntax of the involved and accepted parts of speech. That is why if “the great God” is a fixed description for the Father in Titus 2:13 its “natural definiteness” makes it impossible to identify him further as the “Savior Jesus Christ” (compare note 50), even for Trinitarians! Wallace also claims other grammarians “point out the problem of enumeration, noting, in effect, that in lists of three or more terms, there is a greater tendency to omit the article when it would otherwise be appropriate.” This, too, however, could simply be another instance or type of “natural definiteness” for listed items but, once more, it is not merely a question of the use or absence of the article but of its presence or absence of the article in a “Sharp’s rule” construction. Wallace gets sidetracked on other grammarians’ comments on the former when he is supposed to be explaining Histories 4.71 in relation to the latter. Further, as Winstanley already observed, there is nothing in Middleton’s (Wallace’s) explanation which would keep the very texts where there is a dispute from being subject to the same principle of enumeration and, hence, also potentially explainable on the basis of the presence or absence of the article in this light, in texts such as Titus 2:13. In fact, Samuel G. Green, in his Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament, Revised (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1912), page 198, lists Titus 2:13 in his discussion and illustration of “Combined Enumeration” along with other texts such as Ephesians 3:18, Colossians 2:22, 2 Peter 1:10, and Matthew 17:1, all of which are excluded from Sharp’s first rule! This shows that some who were neutral or even who favored a translation of Titus 2:13 calling Jesus “the great God” (as does Green) included the text in the category of “enumeration,” thereby making Titus 2:13 and texts like it subject to an important, further revision to Wallace’s revision to Sharp’s rule in light of exceptions to it such as Histories 4.71, namely, from “where several nouns are involved in the construction it may or may not follow the rule” (= Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 130; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 128) to what it should be, that is, “where [two or more] nouns are involved in the construction it may or may not follow the rule.” Of course, this would then release the whole matter again to translators’ understanding of common syntax.
A linguistic reason can be given for this phenomenon as well. When TSKS [article-substantive-καί-substantive] fits the rule, the second substantive either further identifies or describes or clarifies something about the first. If so, then typically a third epithet would be superfluous. Unless there are special contextual reasons for the third being there—in particular, to stress the multi-functional character of the person in view, we might in fact normally expect enumerations to indicate more than one individual.  

This explanation by Wallace does not effectively answer the question about why *Histories* 4.71 contains the very syntax Sharp and Wallace would consider part of *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, but for the fact that the nouns are applied to different persons. Wallace simply claims the use of “a third epithet would be superfluous” and then Wallace sets up his own “special contextual reasons for the third [substantive] being there.” Indeed, Wallace cites the enumerated string of more than two substantives (three) from Philippians 2:25, where all three Sharp’s rule nouns apply to one person, and this without being considered “superfluous.”  

In acknowledging *Histories* 4.71 as an exception to Sharp’s first rule, Wallace believes this is appropriate not simply because of grammar but because of (with my emphasis) “special contextual reasons”. This is precisely what is often pointed to by many when it comes to the immediate and larger “contextual reasons” which reveal a clear, special reference associated with many terms of significance in the New Testament, including “God,” “Lord,” “Christ,” and “Savior,” even for more than one individual, such as for both the Father and the Son (but as separate individuals).

3) **Ordinals:** Numbers which are part of a series of numbers. For example, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 are ordinals.

*Example:* Strabo (64 BC to 24 CE), *Geography* 17.1.11.

δ τέταρτος καὶ ἑβδομος

(“the fourth and seventh” [applied to different persons]).

In his explanation of this exception to Sharp’s rule, Wallace writes:

This is a clear violation of Sharp’s canon—and one which does not fit the other categories of exceptions which we have discovered thus far. For this reason it is a rather noteworthy text. It is interesting that Strabo adds “and the last” (καὶ ὁ ὀστατος) with the article. One might conjecture that in a list of this sort, where “the fourth” cannot possibly refer to the

---


25 Ἐπαφρόδιτον τῶν ὄδελφων καὶ συνεργῶν καὶ συστρατιώτην μου (“Epaphroditus, my brother, fellow-worker, and fellow-soldier”).

26 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 128-129; Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, pages 127-128. See my note 23 near the bottom of page 9 for Wallace’s further revision to Sharp’s rule in light of his view of “enumeration,” as well for my counter-revision which puts enumeration in its proper light of “two or more” substantives, rather than Wallace’s preferred “three or more nouns” (see note 16).
same person as “the seventh,” the article could easily be omitted, while since “the seventh” and “the last” could, in a given context, refer to the same person, the article is necessarily reinserted. (It could even happen in this context from a reader’s perspective, for unless one is consciously counting the rulers, some confusion is most likely.)

Consider this example further in its context according to the English translation of Hamilton and Falconer, to which I have added all bracketed numbers, text, and underlining, but not the parenthetical comments which are original to the following translation of Geography 17.1.11:

Alexander was succeeded by [1] Ptolemy the son of Lagus, the son of Lagus by [2] Philadelphus, Philadelphus by [3] Euergetes; next succeeded [4] Philopator the lover of Agathocleia, then [5] Epiphanes, afterwards [6] Philometor, the son (thus far) always succeeding the father. But Philometor was succeeded by his brother, [7] the second Euergetes, who was also called Physcon. He was succeeded by [8] Ptolemy surnamed Lathurus, Lathurus by [9] Auletes of our time, who was the father of Cleopatra. All these kings, after the third Ptolemy, were corrupted by luxury and effeminacy, and the affairs of government were very badly administered by them; but worst of all by the fourth, the seventh [ὁ τέταρτος καὶ ἐβδομος] and the last [καὶ ὁ ὀστατος] (Ptolemy), Auletes (or the Piper).

It is unclear why Wallace creates the possibility for confusion over the number of kings listed here by Strabo, which as I have marked above amounts to “9.” Therefore, it does not appear likely that a reader of Strabo would confuse “the seventh” with “the last,” since “the seventh” is plainly identified as “the second Euergetes” and further as “Physcon,” while “the last” (the “9th”) is also named, “Auletes.” The context and the use of terms and markers of identity, not simply the syntax, tell us ‘who is who.’

4) Translation Greek: For example, Greek used to translate Hebrew.

Example: Proverbs 24.21 (LXX).

φοβου’ τον θεον και βασιλεα
(“My son, fear God and the king”).

That Proverbs 24:21 is not referring to one person in the above text with the two titles “God” and “king” is clear in this case from the plural reference in the same verse (“and do not disobey either of them [αὐτον]”) which unlike the singular pronoun in other, similar texts could only indicate more than one person. This is a clear exception to Sharp’s rule.

Indeed, in spite of the fact that the context and the use of the plural “them” makes it clear two persons are in view, the translator(s) chose to use a “Sharp’s rule” construction to indicate more than one individual referent. Wallace initially offered three admittedly “speculative” explanations for the anarthrous βασιλεα in this text, namely:

27 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 131; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, pages 129-130.


1) The translator, using formal fidelity and dynamic equivalence in his translation, may have been distracted by μικρόν (“my son”), resulting in an unintentional violation of Greek grammar;

2) The translator may have deliberately chosen the anarthrous βασιλέας, believing ‘the location of the syntactically unrelated οἶκος disrupted the semantics of Sharp’s rule.’

3) The “syntax of poetry is known to deviate from that of prose in many and substantial ways ... the article is frequently dispensed with for metrical convenience.”

Though accepting Proverbs 24:21 (LXX) “as an exception to Sharp’s rule,” Wallace feels “it is almost exclusively tied to the LXX as translation Greek.” However, the fact that this is a translation into Greek makes the exception all the more significant, that is, in view of the likely reflection by the translator(s) on which syntax would be best to use in this instance. Further, and similar to what I wrote in my Second Edition’s Excursus on Sharp’s rule in direct response to all three of Wallace’s above explanations:

1) Wallace assumes too much for the LXX translator(s) here in trying to come up with an explanation for this exception to “Sharp’s rule,” citing the translator’s possible ‘distraction’ by one term resulting in “an unintentional violation of Greek grammar,” for which Wallace cites no evidence.

2) Wallace claims the reason for this exception may be because the translator(s) “deliberately” used this syntax believing “the location of the syntactically unrelated οἶκος disrupted the semantics of Sharp’s rule,” even though it is a vocative and not an accusative case noun. That the choice of the anarthrous noun “king” was “deliberate” no one can dispute, because that is what is in the text. Therefore, the burden is on Wallace to show the translator(s) may have been “deliberate” in using a Sharp’s rule construction in this text to indicate two persons because “the location of the syntactically unrelated οἶκος disrupted the semantics of Sharp’s rule.” Further, the location of the vocative “my son” is not unusual in 24:21, that is, after considering its placement at the start of and after the start of sentences throughout Proverbs LXX. Compare the location of οἶκος in Proverbs 1:8, 10; 4:10, 20; 5:1, 7; 6:1, 3; 7:1, 24; 23:15, 19, 22, 26; 24:1, 13; 27:11, 27; 30:1; 31:2. Though none of these texts have οἶκος in a Sharp’s rule construction, they show clearly that οἶκος may come first or later in a sentence without any ‘disruption of the semantics’ to nouns in other grammatical cases, though that is what Wallace claims may have occurred in 24:21, in spite of the fact that Wallace otherwise believes the syntax used is supposed to make clear the application of the involved nouns.

3) Wallace acknowledges that verbs, adjectives and pronouns occasionally interfere with article-noun-καί-noun constructions, but that in any event “the καί in Prov 24:21 still connects the two accusatives syntactically, in spite of the presence of the vocative.”

Indeed, “and” does connect the “two accusatives syntactically,” and there is no reason for anyone to get “distracted” by the presence of a vocative. Yet, Wallace clearly is distracted by

---


31 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 126, notes 116, 117; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 125, notes 71 and 72. Note, however, Wallace’s hedging from his 1995 dissertation to his 2009 publication, both of which are identical except for the underlined part:

Wallace (1995): “the καί in Prov 24:21 still connects the two accusatives syntactically ...”

Wallace, (2009): “the καί in Prov 24:21 still seems to connect the two accusatives syntactically ...”
it because he cannot use Sharp’s rule to interpret this text in spite of the fact that it fits all of the requirements of “Sharp’s rule.” The fact that Greek was used to translate the Hebrew text of Proverbs 24:21 is not the issue (though Wallace has made it the issue, in large part), because of the fact that the Proverbs Greek translator(s) “deliberately” chose to use a “Sharp’s rule” construction to indicate two persons, without any apparent concern for any potential ambiguity resulting from the translation or from the placement of οἱ ἔ.

Further, several church writers quote Proverbs 24:21 verbatim from the LXX or from another Greek version, or possibly they translate the text in such a way so that it appears to be an even more clear instance of an exception to Sharp’s first rule. For example, Wallace references John Chrysostom (c. 350—407) and John of Damascus (c. 675—749) as he attempts to group these references along with Proverbs 24:21(LXX) as “translation Greek.” But neither John Chrysostom nor John of Damascus appear to have translated the text they quoted (though that is possible), since nothing else in their writings indicates here that they were translating another language into Greek.

Also, in his 1995 dissertation and in his 2009 Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin for some reason Wallace does not cite the use of Proverbs 24:21 in Ignatius’ longer version of Smyrnaeans (Chapter 9), which makes even clearer the application of “king” to the one ruling at that time, that is, the one whom “none of the rulers should be compared.” This makes the “king” here specific, even as “God,” “Christ,” and also “bishop” are or can be specific references to single, significant and so also known persons. When “kings” in general are meant the plural form is used just as it is used later in this text from the longer version of Smyrnaeans 9. Wallace’s omission of this text is significant for at least three reasons: 1) The citation of Proverbs 24:21 in the longer version of Ignatius’ Smyrnaeans 9 contains a rewording of the text so that it is an even more clearly identifiable instance of a “Sharp’s rule” construction, but which still breaks Sharp’s first rule; 2) I cited this text for Wallace in both my 1998 and

32 I have checked the citations in Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 127, note 121; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 127, note 78.


34 Where it concerns the inclusion of “bishop” in this series of figures, consider the shorter version of Ignatius’ declaration that “the one who does anything without the bishop’s knowledge serves the devil” (ὁ λόθρα ἐπισκόπου τι πράσων τῷ διοικώμενῳ λατρεύει [translation and text in J. B. Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer, The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations of Their Writings, Second Edition, edited and revised by Michael W. Holmes (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), pages 190-191]).

35 Εἴ γὰρ ὁ βασιλεύσιν ἐπειρομένος (“if the one rising up against kings” [Greek text from Cureton, Corpus Ignatium, page 111]).

36 Note the intentional relocation (if a quotation) of the vocative οἱ ἔ to before τὸν θεόν, though no other change was made to the article-noun-koi-noun construction: φησίν, οἱ ἔ, τὸν θεόν καὶ βασιλέα (Migne 853.10).
my 2000 Excursuses on this subject;\textsuperscript{37} and 3) \textit{Winstanley cited it for Sharp} (and so also for Wallace, who clearly did read Winstanley’s \textit{Vindication}).\textsuperscript{38}

In his 2009 publication Wallace adds a fourth possible explanation for Proverbs 24:21 LXX’s breaking of Sharp’s rule, which reason Wallace did not include in his 1995 dissertation, namely, that “king” may be used generically rather than specifically for one individual (see the discussion of generic nouns on pages 6-7). According to Wallace (with my underlining): “A fourth possibility is simply that \textit{βασιλέα} [‘king’] here is to be taken generically. That is, ‘Fear God and whoever the king happens to be.’”\textsuperscript{39}

Wallace points out that “king” is used in Proverbs thirty-five times, but in his view only twice for “a specific king.” Though Wallace does not list out all of his references, one of the two specific (non-generic) “king” references which Wallace accepts for this book comes in Proverbs 25:1, shortly after 24:21. Wallace’s other reference to a specific “king” in Proverbs is in 31:1. Wallace fails to note \textit{ἐκ προσώπου βασιλέως} in 25:5, which could hardly mean “you must slay evil (ones)” (κτείνε ἀσεβεῖς) from before the “face” of “whoever the king happens to be.” What if the king is evil? Finally, there may also be a specific reference to the then ruling (and so also known) “king” in 25:6, for there “king” is contrasted with the generic plural for “rulers” (δυναστῶν).

Further, in 24:21 (LXX) the verse concludes with, “and do not disobey \textit{either one of them}” (καὶ \textit{μηδέτερος} αὐτῶν \textit{ἀπειθήσῃς}). The LXX here uses a form of \textit{μηδέτερος} (also \textit{μηδέτερος}). Used only here in Proverbs 24:21 in the entire LXX, and nowhere in the NT, this adjective clearly describes those who should \textit{not} be disobeyed, namely, “neither of the two.”\textsuperscript{40} In this case, the reader is not to “disobey” either the specific “God” or “king” who is ruling, not ‘whoever he happens to be.’

Proverbs 24:21(LXX) and its citation \textit{verbatim} and otherwise in the writings of the early church fathers Ignatius, John Chrysostom, and John of Damascus are all further exceptions to Sharp’s first rule involving personal ‘nouns of signification’ (“God” and “king”) applied to two different persons, though only the first of the two personal nouns has the article.

5) \textbf{New Testament Greek:} Greek as used in the various writings of the New Testament.

\textit{Examples:} Ephesians 5:5.


\textsuperscript{38} After quoting Proverbs 24:21 in the LXX, Winstanley writes to Sharp as follows (with my underlining):

\textit{This passage from the Septuagint, which I am surprised you should have overlooked, is thus quoted, in the interpolated epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrneans: φησίν, ὅτι, \textit{τον θεόν καὶ βασιλέα} [as presented by Winstanley in his Vindication, page 11].}

\textsuperscript{39} Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 126.

\textsuperscript{40} Edwin Hatch and Henry A. Redpath, \textit{A Concordance to the Septuagint}, Second Edition (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), page 921, who note the form \textit{μηδέτερος} is used by Aquila in his version of Proverbs 24:21.

2 Thessalonians 1:12.

τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

(“of our God and Lord Jesus Christ”).

1 Timothy 5:21.

τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἄγγελων

(“of God and Christ Jesus and the chosen angels”).

Though Sharp believed all of the above NT texts fit his first rule (and so in all of them Sharp believed Jesus to be called “God”), Wallace does not. His reasons for rejecting the above texts as instances of Sharp’s rule are: 1) In texts such as 1 Timothy 5:21 “‘Christ Jesus’ is surely a proper name”; 2) Wallace believes “one would be hard-pressed to view this [‘Christ’ in Ephesians 5:5] as less than a proper name”; and 3) “Second Thessalonians 1:12 does not have merely ‘Lord’ in the equation, but ‘Lord Jesus Christ,’” and so Wallace believes that “only by-detaching [‘Lord’] from [‘Jesus Christ’] could one apply Sharp’s rule to this construction.”

42 See Sharp, Remarks, pages 28-29, 32-35, 35-37. There are other texts which Sharp fit into his discussion of christologically significant texts, including what have become perhaps the most significant two of them all in terms of the application of Sharp’s rule in the NT (namely, Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1), but which I have discussed at length previously (see Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended, First Edition, pages 238-246; and, especially, my Second Edition, pages 388-405). Jude 4, in several readings, also fits into this discussion. For more on Jude 4 according to the reading of P72 and other texts, see note α, on pages 3-5, in my, “The Letter of Jude: A New Translation According to the Text of P72,” Elihu Online Papers 5 (January 18, 2012).

43 But compare Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 247, note 202, and Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 237, note 7, which shows that Wallace is at this point still unable to make a decision on this text, “exact parallels to Eph 5:5 are not easily forthcoming ... We must, therefore, in this thesis [‘this volume’ (2009)] remain undecided.”

44 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 246-247; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, pages 236-237. In his note to this comment (page 246, note 200 in “Multiple Substantives”; page 236, note 5 in Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin) Wallace writes, “So Sharp, Remarks, 34-35.” But Sharp, after first claiming on his page 32 that “if two distinct persons had really been intended to be expressed ... the article would have been repeated ... after the copulative and before the second substantive” (which is not true; see Matthew 22:32 [compare Luke 20:37; John 13:13; 2 John 7; Revelation 1:5], notes on pages 33-34 of his Remarks that in the “Alexandrian MS.” the text is “awkwardly divided” by a point which by adding to the text after the word for “our” the “intention of the transcriber ... has been probably to make a distinction of persons” (underlining added)! Sharp then attempts to discredit the Alexandrian manuscript’s apparent use of punctuation because of what he calls “the ignorance and fallacy of the interpolator.” Further, Sharp does not fully or fairly consider the proper character or usage of the nouns or the full significance of the definite reference indicated by the name “Jesus” included in the second part of 2 Thessalonians 1:12 and in other, similar texts. The need for this was repeatedly pointed out to Sharp and to Middleton by Blunt (see, for example, my quotation of Blunt in part on this point on page 6, note 11), by Winstanley (see, for examples, Vindication, pages 23-24, 27-28, 30, and especially the Appendix to Winstanley’s American Edition, pages 45-55), and in The Monthly Review (June, 1810), page 152, the last of which reads as follows concerning the application of Sharp’s rule by Middleton (all bracketed comments are mine and underlining has been added):

[Though ‘commonly subject to Mr. Sharp’s rule [referring to Middleton’s comments],’ ['Lord'] is not subject to it in some of the texts which he has adduced (such as 2Thess. i. 12. 1Tim v. 21. and 2Tim iv. 1.) on account of its being [or containing] a proper name, or part of a proper name, and yet may, even when standing close to the proper name ["Jesus Christ"], be so ‘disjoined and detached from it’ as to make no approach towards a proper name, but, on the contrary, be so perfectly appellative as to ‘be identified with a preceding attributive.’ ... Now as Mr. Sharp, by one of his limitations, has excluded proper names from his rule, Dr. Middleton, by his remarks concerning [“Christ”], [“Lord”], and [“God”], and their approaches towards proper names, has rendered it very
It must be emphasized here that the above listed and other, similar NT other texts which include 1) a proper name (“Jesus”), 2) a noun which has become the same as or similar to a proper name by its application to specific or known individuals (“quasi-proper names,” such as “God,” “Lord,” “Christ,” and “Savior”), or 3) which contain both a proper name and a noun of personal description used together as a compound proper name (“Lord Jesus Christ,” “Christ Jesus,” and even “Savior Jesus Christ”) are the most comparable examples to texts such as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1.

Indeed, consider the second part of these last two texts together with the second part of the construction used in 2 Thessalonians 1:12:

2 Thessalonians 1:12: ... καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
Titus 2:13: ... καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
2 Peter 1:1: ... καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

Notice that, aside from the possessive pronoun in Titus 2:13, the constructions are the same except that in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 we have “Lord Jesus Christ” and in the two disputed texts we have “Savior Jesus Christ.” According to Wallace, while in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 “‘Lord Jesus Christ’ is a compound proper name and therefore outside the pale of Sharp’s principle,”45 in Titus 2:13 and in 2 Peter 1:1 the use of “Savior” and “Savior Jesus Christ” are considered differently, that is (by Wallace and by others, though not by all), not as proper or as quasi proper names or as a compound proper name. This is because, according to Murray J. Harris (quoted with approval by Wallace):

45Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 250, note 211. Compare Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 243, note 21, in which the matter is put more carefully (“‘Lord Jesus Christ’ is almost always a compound proper name”), though Wallace reaches the same conclusion (“and therefore outside the pale of Sharp’s principle”). Before Wallace, Middleton had already acknowledged, “Κύριος Ι. Χρ. is a common title of Christ, and is often used independently of all that precedes it.” So its occurrence in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 “affords no certain evidence in favor of Mr. Sharp” (The Doctrine of the Greek Article, pages 381, 382). Further, as I noted in my Second Edition’s Excursus on this subject (page 387), in “The Use of the Articular and Anarthrous Κύριος in the Pauline Corpus” (M.A. thesis, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1989), pages 31-33, Carl J. Davis lists the occurrences of compound names for Jesus with κύριος, concluding that “when κύριος is joined to θεός by καί, κύριος generally lacks the definite article” (underlining added). Combine this with Abbot’s important but rather obvious observation, “the simple addition of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ to κυρίου makes the reference to the two distinct subjects clear without the insertion of the article” (Abbot, “On the Construction of Titus ii. 13,” page 15).
Only if it could be established that σωτήρ (ἡμῶν) Ἰησοῦς Χριστός was an early creedal formula comparable to κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός could one argue that σωτήρ was anarthrous in Titus 2:13 [or in 2 Peter 1:1] because of its widespread technical use.\(^46\)

And, yet, to quote Werner Foerster (with my underlining):

In 2 Peter σωτήρ is used only of Jesus and it is relatively common, 1:1, 11; 2:20; 3:2, 18. The context, however, provide no clear basis for its choice. The three titles of Jesus, θεός, κύριος, and σωτήρ alternate for no obvious reason, as may be seen from the expression ἐν ἐπιγνώσει: ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν (1:2); ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (2:20); ἐν... γνώσει τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (3:18); cf. also ἐν δικαιωσούν τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:1). It would seem that σωτήρ was a common title for Christ in the days of 2 Pt. An unmistakable liking for solemn and resounding statements contributed to the frequent use of σωτήρ predication in this letter.\(^47\)

I have underlined the introductory formulas along with each text containing a Sharp or Sharp-similar (1:2) construction cited by Foerster in making his point that “the three titles of Jesus, θεός, κύριος, and σωτήρ alternate for no obvious reason,” and “that σωτήρ was a title for Christ in the days of 2 Pt.,” as is evidenced by “the frequent use of σωτήρ predication in this letter.”

However, though Alford claims “there is no doubt that σωτήρ [‘Savior,’ by itself] was one of those words which gradually dropped the article and became a quasi proper name,”\(^48\) it is not necessary in the case of either Titus 2:13 or 2 Peter 1:1 to view σωτήρ (“Savior”) alone as a

\(^{46}\) Cited in Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 263, note 247; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 254, note 58, a view to which Wallace says “nothing more needs to be said!” See also Harris, Jesus as God: The New Testament Use of Theos in Reference to Jesus (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), page 181. On page 182 of Jesus as God Harris accurately represents a view contrary to his own, which holds that the “prefixing of the appositional substantive σωτήρος to the proper name of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ has led to the anarthrous state of σωτήρος.” Harris responds to this view by writing on his page 182 (though all bracketed comments are mine):

> It is not clear, however, that an appositional noun [such as “Savior”] that precedes proper name [such as “Jesus Christ”] is necessarily anarthrous [though it often is, including in both Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1]. Second Timothy 1:10 has διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, while in four other passages in the Pastoral σωτήρ ἡμῶν is articular preceding the anarthrous quasi-proper name θεός.

As I wrote in my Second Edition’s Excursus on this subject (page 399), “none of the examples Harris gives are parallel to Titus 2:13 [or to 2 Peter 1:1]” in their use of “Savior Jesus Christ” because none of them have “Savior Jesus Christ” following καί. The possible significance of such terms when standing apart from or when immediately following καί is clear from the use of similar terms (such as “Lord” [see note 45]) and from the use of “Savior” in the very examples Harris gives. Indeed, all five of his Pastoral examples (1 Timothy 2:3; Titus 1:3; 2:10; 3:4; 2 Timothy 1:10) have the article before “Savior.” Yet, when you consider the NT use of “Savior” when it immediately follows καί (Acts 5:31; Philippians 3:20; Titus 2:13; 2 Peter 1:1; 11; 2:20; 3:2, 18), it is always anarthrous. This is true also in the LXX (see Esther 5:1; Psalm 26:1; 61:3, 7; Isaiah 45:21). Finally, it should be noted that none of Harris’ examples use “Savior” with “Jesus Christ,” though this usage does occur with “Savior” articulated apart from a καί-joined expression in Titus 3:6 (διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν).


proper name, or even as a proper name equivalent, though its use in the NT strongly suggests it was known and used as such, particularly in 2 Peter, similar to the uses of “Lord” and “Christ.” Abbot, though expressly stating he finds “no sufficient proof of [Alford’s] statement that 

\[\text{swth'ro} \] had become in the N.T. ‘a quasi proper name’,” still goes on to make one of the key points involving the actual proper name that is, in fact, used in these texts (with my underlining):

\[\text{The addition of } \text{'Ihsou' } \text{Christov to swth'ro' } \text{hJmw'n changes the case entirely, restricting the swth'ro' } \text{hJmw'n to a person or being who, according to Paul's habitual use of language, is distinguished from the person or being whom he designates as } \text{o' } \text{theo}'c, \text{so that there was no need of the repetition of the article to prevent ambiguity.}\]

---

49 See my discussion of Ephesians 5:5 and its use of “Christ” as a proper name or as a fixed designation for Jesus in my Excursus on Sharp’s rule in Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended, Second Edition, pages 384-386. See also Robert W. Funk, “The Syntax of the Greek Article: Its Importance for Critical Pauline Problems” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1953), page 192, who writes that “the messianic designation [Christos] comes to be a personal name” even though Paul often uses it without the article. In Ephesians when \(\text{Christos}\) is used by itself (for example, apart from the name \(\text{'Ihsos}\)) it is without the article seven times (1:3; 2:12; 4:15, 32; 5:21, 32; 6:6) and twenty times it has the article (1:9; 12; 20; 2:5; 13; 4:4, 17; 19; 4:7, 12; 13, 20; 5:2; 14; 23, 24, 25, 29; 6:5). When used together with \(\text{'Ihsos}\), it is without the article thirteen times (1:1 [twice]; 2:5; 14, 21, 25; 2:20; 6:23, 24) and only twice does it take the article (3:1 [supported by \(\text{N}^2\) A B C D² Ψ]. 11). Therefore, it is not surprising to find that \(\text{Christos}\), used apart from the name \(\text{'Ihsos}\), is preceded by the article in Ephesians 5:5, but separate from “God” which follows it, consistent also with Paul’s practice elsewhere in Ephesians (1:1, 2, 3, 17; 2:4-5, 10, 19-20; 3:10-11; 4:32; 5:2, 20; 6:23), that is, of presenting but also differentiating “God” and “Christ.”

50 Abbot, “On the Construction of Titus ii. 13,” page 14. For more on “Paul’s habitual use of language,” see my figure “E.1” on pages 390-392 of my Second Edition of Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended, which shows and discusses the “Use of theo'c in the Pauline Corpus.” In relation to Abbot’s comments about Paul’s “habitual use of language,” I will here also note that the “considerations derived from Paul’s system of doctrine” mentioned by G.B. Winer (A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek, trans. W.F. Moulton [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1882], page 162), have been unfairly represented by Wallace, as if “G. B. Winer ... allowed his theological bias to override the plain evidence from the syntax governed by Sharp’s Rule” (Wallace, “The Semantic Range,” page 64). Wallace goes even further in his 1995 and 2009 treatments of Sharp’s rule, writing (with my underlining added):

George Benedict Winer, the great NT grammarian of the nineteenth century, in this instance spoke outside of his realm, for he gave an unsubstantiated opinion based on a theological preunderstanding. Yet this single footnote largely brought about the eclipse of understanding of Sharp’s rule. Friend and foe alike have unwittingly abused the canon, with the result that scores of NT passages have been misunderstood. [Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 280; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 282; compare Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 66-67; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, pages 69-70.]

Here is Winer’s “single footnote,” in relevant part (with my underlining):

\[\text{For reasons which lie in the doctrinal system of Paul, I do not regard swth'ro' ['Savior'] as a second predicate by the side of theo'c ['God'], as if Christ were first styled o' mege'c theo'c ['the great God'] and then swth'ro' ['Savior']. ... [then to footnote 2: ...] the dogmatic conviction derived from Paul’s writings that this apostle cannot have called Christ the great God} \text{induced me to show that there is no grammatical obstacle to our taking the clause [o' swth'ro' 'Ihsos }\text{Christos] by itself, as referring to a second subject. [Winer, A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek, page 162, and from note 2 on the same page.]}

Wallace writes that Winer’s concerns over what he considered Paul’s ‘doctrine’ or belief about calling Christ, not simply “G-god,” but “the great God,” amount to “unsubstantiated opinion based on a theological preunderstanding.” Yet, not only did Winer (and Moulton, in his translation of Winer here) provide significant grammatical evaluations of Sharp’s rule texts (see Winer’s A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek, pages 162-163, which I will discuss further in my pending The “Sharpest Rule”), but as I have shown also in my Second Edition (see pages 389-396), and as Ezra Abbot showed even before me (see Abbot, “On the Construction of Titus ii. 13,” page 19), Winer was right to essentially note the restricted nature of the description, “the great God” (\(\text{to' o' mege'kh' theo'c}\) in Titus 2:13 as belonging to the Father because of its fixed use for him in the OT and elsewhere (see, for examples, the
LXX of Deuteronomy 7:21 [τὸν μεγάν καὶ κραστάν, “a great and powerful God”]; 10:17 [ὁ θεός ὁ μεγάς καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὁ φωτεινός, “the great and strong God, the fear-inspiring one” (Rahlfs’ edition; but A [and the Göttingen] show the article before all three adjectives—see my note 76 in my Second Edition’s Excursus on Sharp’s rule, page 389)]; Nehemiah 8:6 [τον θεον τον μεγαν, “the great God”]; Psalm 77[76]:13[14] [τίς θεός μεγάς ὢς ὁ θεός, “who is a great God like God?”]; 85:10 [ὥτε μεγάς, ἔ ο ο ο ο ο ο, “For you are great ... you alone are the great God”]; see also Ezra 5:8 [2 Ezra in Rahlfs]; Nehemiah 4:14; Psalm 95[94]:3; Isaiah 26:5; Jeremiah 39[32]:19; Daniel 2:45 and 9:4 [compare the two readings in Rahlfs]). This fixed description is also found in the Dead Sea Scrolls, even distinguishing “the great God” from his “Son.” In the famous, Aramaic “Son of God” text (4Q246), which is strikingly similar to Luke 1:32-35, we read of the “Son of the Most High” in column 1, line 1, and about how his “kingdom will be an everlasting kingdom” in column 2, line 5. Then in line 7, column 1, it says “the great God [יָהוּ יָהוּ] will be his patron” (see John J. Collins, “A Pre-Christian ‘Son of God’ Among the Dead Sea Scrolls,” BR 9.3 [June 1993], page 37, underlining added). Related to the fixed nature of this description, as noted in G.A. Cooke, A Text-Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), page 250, there are also inscriptions and coins where the two terms used for “the great God” (יָהוּ יָהוּ) are combined to form the proper name יָהוּ יָהוּ-רַב (Rabel), which was used for the last Nabataean king. The distinction between “the great God” and his “Son” was also carried over into later Christian tradition, as can be seen from the use of “the great God” in the Sibylline Oracles (see my Second Edition Excursus, page 395, note 102). Two of these references (1.324 and 3.776) are considered later Christian interpolations which refer to “the son of the great God,” which is very similar to the language used in 4Q246. See also the OT Apocrypha in 3 Maccabees 7:2, which uses τὸ μεγάλου θεοῦ and where the superlative of μέγας (μεγίστος, “greatest”) modifies “God” in several other texts (see 2 Maccabees 3:36; 3 Maccabees 1:9; 16; 3:11; 4:16; 5:25; 7:22 [Codex A reads megalou]). This is similar to what we find in Josephus, who regularly refers to the God of the OT as ὁ μεγίστος θεὸς (see A Complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus, Karl H. Rengstorf, ed., vol. 3 [Leiden: Brill, 1979], pages 63-70). Examples include Antiquities of the Jews 6.86; 7.353; 8.319 (megalou is a variant reading for megistou here); 9.133, 288-289; 11.3, 90. In Philo’s work On the Special Law Books (4.177) he quotes Deuteronomy 10:17-18, where ὁ θεός ὁ μεγάς (“the great God”) is used (see also On the Cheribum [30.1] where Philo refers to τὸ μεγάλου καὶ φιλόδομου θεοῦ (“the great and bountiful God”) and On Dreams [1.94], τὸ πάντα μεγάλου θεοῦ (“the infinitely great God” (LCL translation))]. There is good evidence, therefore, to show that before, during, and after the first century CE “the great God” was a fixed expression for God the Father. This has been largely ignored by Wallace (compare his rather weak response to a similar point by Fee in Wallace’s Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 263, note 88). Yet, this is exactly what Winer was concerned about: If “the great God” refers to the Father then it cannot also apply to “Savior Jesus Christ,” that is, according to Paul’s regular ‘doctrine’ which consistently separates the Father from “Jesus” (this is true even in Trinitarianism), since “Jesus” is not the “Father” and Jesus is not regularly or even ever clearly called “the great God.” Instead of addressing my full range of arguments supporting Winer’s hesitation in this matter, in his 2009 publication’s note 59, page 254, Wallace first expressly cites the 2000 Excursus from my Second Edition of Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended, but Wallace then refers to J. Ed Komoszewski’s earlier 1999 reply to my 1998 First Edition’s Excursus (which is not cited by Wallace), to which I responded before my 2000 Excursus was ever published! This gives the impression that Komoszewski’s article is inclusive of a response to my 2000 Second Edition when it could not possibly have been as it was written before 2000, in 1999, in response to my 1998, First Edition. The link to Komoszewski’s article is also cited in Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 254, note 59, which according to his note 59 Wallace “last accessed” on November 24, 2006 (and which I last checked on January 30, 2012). However, my response to Komoszewski’s 1999 article, with a link to his article (though neither Komoszewski nor Wallace link or reference my earlier, online response to Komoszewski) has been listed on “Jehovah’s Witnesses United” web site (http://www.jehovah.to/exe/discussion/nwt_asks.htm [last accessed on January 30, 2012]) for 12 years! Further, in their book Putting Jesus in His Place: The Case for the Deity of Christ (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 2007), Komoszewski and Robert M. Bowman, Jr., refer, not to Komoszewski’s 1999 online article, but to Bowman’s, “Sharp’s Rules and Antitrinitarian Theologies: A Defense of Granville Sharp’s Argument for the Deity of Christ” article (no date given). Yet, now as of January 30, 2012, the link cited on page 333, in note 46 (http://www.biblicalapologetics.net/NTStudies/Sharps_Rule.pdf) of Putting Jesus in His Place does not produce an active document or a web page for anything related to “Biblical Apologetics,” let alone Sharp’s rule. Indeed, the home site “www.biblicalapologetics.net” does not come up at all (last checked on January 30, 2012). The only copies of Bowman’s article which I received from him or which I have since found online are dated May 25, 1998, and “Revised,” August 19, 1998 (labeled as “A Bicentennial Defense,” which description is left out of Bowman’s and Komoszewski’s reference). However, as with Komoszewski’s article (cited by Wallace) both of Bowman’s “Sharp’s Rules and Antitrinitarian Theologies” predate my 2000 Excursus, and my 2000 Second Edition Excursus includes material from my online discussions with Bowman concerning his 1998 “Bicentennial” article which Bowman has yet to address (link to “Discussion Logs”: http://www.jehovah.to/exe/discussion/index.htm [last
There is at least one other NT exception to Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin to cite here, one which is not cited for discussion by Sharp, by Middleton, or by Wallace, and so is likely another new exception for many:

1 Timothy 6:13.

τοῦ θεοῦ ... καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦν

(“of God ... and Christ Jesus”).

Where I have used ellipsis ( ... ) the above text has τοῦ ζωογόνουντος τὰ πάντα in apposition to τοῦ θεοῦ and τοῦ μαρτυρήσαντος ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου τὴν καλὴν ὁμολογίαν in apposition to Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦν. This is another exception to Sharp’s rule, and it shows how far apart a NT writer was prepared to separate the two nouns without any apparent concern for whether readers would make the necessary contextual identifications and associations in spite of the fact that a Sharp’s first rule construction is used.

In late 1995, after I had read Wallace’s 1983 article in Grace Theological Journal (cited earlier) while researching “Sharp’s rule,” I called Wallace at Dallas Theological Seminary regarding 1 Timothy 6:13 as an exception to Sharp’s rule. Wallace answered the phone and after introducing myself I noted the text in question. We reviewed the text together and I asked him about it, after which Wallace replied, “Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦν is a proper name.” This seemed to me to be a selective viewing of terms as proper names or as their equivalents, given Wallace’s view of other texts with similarly significant terms. But it was not the place to pursue the matter further. We discussed a few other, related matters, which I then followed up with by letter on December 27, 1995 (see Appendix). I have never received a response to this letter, and while 1 Timothy 6:13 is clearly another exception to Sharp’s rule, Wallace did not reference it in his 1995 dissertation or in his 2009 Sharp’s Canon publication.

In view of the preceding, one might consider 1 Timothy 6:13 “another exception to Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin,” that is, due in part to Wallace’s avoidance of it in his two primary discussions of Sharp’s rule. But it is not the new exception which is connected with the title of the present paper (but see again note *, page 1). Before I introduce this new, yet somewhat older exception there are still other exceptions to Sharp’s first rule to consider. I will note here, however, that of the 79 non-variant examples listed by Wallace in his 2009 publication

accessed January 30, 2012]. I will discuss all of this further, along with Wallace’s mistreatment of Winer, Moulton, Simcox, the testimony of “Mr. Gregory Blunt,” Calvin Winstanley, Ezra Abbot, and others in my pending work, The “Sharpest Rule.” I will close this note by pointing out that what helped to begin the ‘eclipse’ of “understanding” of Sharp’s rule was Sharp himself (see my discussion on pages 4-5).

51 In fact, 1 Timothy 6:13 was cited and discussed long ago by Winstanley (Vindication, pages 26-27). After citing Ephesians 5:5, 1 Timothy 5:21, and 1 Timothy 6:13, all exceptions to Sharp’s first rule, Winstanley wrote to Sharp:

For what have we before us in the three passages? They are neither more or less than so many similar obtestations [witnesses], from the same author, addressed to the same persons, comprising terms of the same import” [Winstanley, Vindication, page 27.]

It would, therefore, appear to be impossible for Wallace to have unintentionally missed the occurrence of and the exception to Sharp’s first rule in 1 Timothy 6:13. Yet, Wallace cites and discusses this text nowhere in his “Sharps’ rule”-related writings that I have seen, not even when presenting Winstanley’s arguments and counter-examples to Sharp’s rule (see Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 57-61, 112, 122-135, 258-267; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, pages 61-65, 113, 122-133, 249-272). Still, with all of the examples and texts which appear similar and which are involved in this discussion, such oversights may be unexpected at times.
31 only appear comparable in their use of an indisputable proper name (“Jesus”) in the second position, or in their use of nouns as quasi proper names (“Lord,” “Christ”), or in using both a proper name and a quasi proper noun together as compound titles or as fixed expressions (such as “Lord Jesus Christ,” or “Savior Jesus Christ”).

6) **Patristic Greek:** Greek as used by Christians who lived and who wrote, in large part about theology and Christian doctrine, near the end of and after the first century CE.

**Examples:** *Martyrdom of Polycarp* 22.1.

δῶξα τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρί καὶ ἐγώ ψυχαὶ ("glory to the God and Father and to the Holy Spirit").


τῷ μονῷ πατρί καὶ υἱῷ ("to the only Father and to the Son").

These examples from early church “fathers” (patristics) refer to “God,” to “the only Father,” “to the Son,” and “to the Holy Spirit,” which is significant since 1) they are both exceptions to Sharp’s rule and 2) the most commonly disputed NT passages (Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1) also use similar terms for some (two) of the same persons.

The significance of this point is not lost by Wallace, who gives two explanations for these two exceptions to Sharp’s rule, the first of which is (with my underlining), “It is just possible that by the second century the terms used for the first person of the Trinity became so fixed that the writers regarded them as virtual proper names”!

---

52 The texts which are most comparable to disputed texts (such as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1) include Matthew 12:26; Luke 20:37; John 20:17; Romans 15:6; 1 Corinthians 15:24; 2 Corinthians 1:3; 1:21; 11:31; Galatians 1:4; Ephesians 1:3; 5:20; Philippians 4:20; Colossians 1:3; 2:2; 3:17; 1 Thessalonians 1:3; 3:11; 3:13; 1 Timothy 6:13; 6:15; Hebrews 12:2; James 1:27; 3:9; 1 Peter 1:3; 2 Peter 1:11; 2:20; 3:2; 3:18; Jude 4; Revelation 1:6. I will discuss further the significance of Wallace’s NT examples in my pending work, *The “Sharpest Rule.”* But the differences between these texts and those listed by Wallace in his appendix are obvious, foremost of which is the fact that many of the christologically significant NT texts often have *the proper name “Jesus” included in the expression.* This makes the question of whether the personal noun (“Savior”) is semantically restricted by the proper name with which it is associated rather moot, as it is unlikely that a first-century CE and following reader would have failed to connect the proper name “Jesus” with “Savior” in both Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1.

53 The Greek text for Clement is from Migne (but without his use of capital letters). The Greek and English for the text from the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* is from Kirsopp Lake’s *The Apostolic Fathers*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959 [1913]), page 341.

54 And so Wallace essentially ends up coming nearly full circle in his suggestion here from where he tried to leave Middleton, that is, by considering what he earlier had called “the weakest link in the vindication of Sharp’s rule” (Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 65 [compare page 268]; Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 68 [compare page 267]), namely, “no ambiguity could result, for the distinctions in the members of the Trinity were obvious to all,” especially if these terms “became so fixed that the writers regarded them as virtual proper names.” See also C. Kuehne “The Greek Article and the Doctrine of Christ’s Deity,” *Theology* 14 (June, 1974), pages 18-19, who is similarly forced to concede the following regarding the example from the *Martyrdom of Polycarp*:

One would indeed have expected a repetition of the article before ἄγεω ψυχαὶ (“holy spirit”). Yet its absence here could hardly result in any ambiguity, for the distinction between the first and the third persons of the Trinity was apparently deemed too clear for any confusion to arise.
As noted earlier, the usage of the NT shows quite clearly that the term “Savior” was also often a fixed designation for “Jesus,” as distinct from the Father. However, returning to the patristic exceptions above Wallace goes on to note there “are problems with” viewing the terms in these texts as “fixed,” since Wallace would have expected similar phrases (such as, “the God over all” [Romans 9:5] and “Almighty God” [Revelation 16:14]) to likewise have been regarded as equivalents of proper names, and Wallace believes they are occasionally applied to both the Father and Son in the writings of the Fathers.55

What Wallace expects and what we actually find in the text are not always the same things. The fact is, Martyrdom 22.1 uses a Sharp’s rule construction with terms which are not proper names but which at times function similarly, since they often have fixed reference, and so they do not always need the article even when used in a “Sharp’s rule” construction. When it comes to identifying ‘who is who,’ more than just the syntax of the text in question must be considered. If anything, Sharp’s rule, exceptions to it, and the history of its application to the NT and elsewhere has made this clear!

Still, Wallace considers it a better approach to “recognize that we are assuming too much about [the ‘early church fathers’] own christological articulation ... of the distinctions between members of the Trinity.”56 Wallace then argues that the patristic exceptions to Sharp’s rule are really just examples of the church fathers ‘overstating their case.’ But

55 For a discussion of Romans 9:5, see my Second Edition of Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended, Chapter 3, pages 143-152. See also my more recent discussion in, “Punctuation in Early Greek New Testament Texts,” Elishal Online Papers 3 (September 4, 2010 [rev. February 7, 2011]). The fact is, however, no one is arguing “God,” “the great God,” “God over all,” or even “Christ” or “Lord” are always proper names, or even that they always function as such. It depends on the context, the subjects involved, the events, other descriptions, in short, the extent of definable or isolatable significance attached to the use of a term in reference to a particular individual in a sense different from all others who may have the same term applied to them. This can be seen most clearly in the author’s “habitual use of language.” While Wallace admits “Christ” is probably a proper name at times (see note 49, pages 17-18, for more on the use of “Christ” in Ephesians 5:5), it is not used as such elsewhere in the NT when the context or when the speaker make the application plain, as in Matthew 24:5. Justin Martyr provides some further evidence that “Christ” was considered a name perhaps only by some during his time. Justin wrote, “His Son ... is called Christ, in reference to His being anointed and God’s ordering all things through him; this name itself also containing an unknown significance” (from Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1, page 190). Justin here contrasts the name “Christ” (Χριστός ... δοξα ... οὐτό) with terms such as “God,” “Creator,” and “Lord” which he does not view as “names” (οὐκ ὄνομα ἐστιν). Still, there is some uncertainty as to whether Justin views “Christ” as a name in the same sense as “Jesus,” to which Justin next refers. In making it known a second time that “God’ is not a name,” Justin prefaces his statement with a comparison between “God” and “Christ” using ἀν τρόποιν (meaning “in the same way as”). This could mean “God” is not a proper “name” in the same way “Christ” is not a name like “Jesus” is a name, even though Justin clearly does also use ἄνομα in reference to “Christ.” See my chart on pages 390-392 of my Second Edition’s Excursus, and my note 96 on page 393 of the same, which show that while “God” alone may not always be a proper name it does frequently serve as a semantic signal for the Father alone, as distinct from his Son. In this way, it also often serves as the equivalent of a proper name in the writings of Paul, Peter, and elsewhere in the NT.

56 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 268-269; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, pages 268-269.
Wallace does not illustrate how this is allegedly the case in either the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* or in Clement of Alexandria.

Instead, Wallace claims that “in their zeal to defend the deity of Christ they [= the ‘early church fathers’] proved too much.” Yet, nowhere in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* is there an attempt to “defend the deity of Christ.” There is an account of Christian martyrdom (hence, the title). There is also an issue of loyalty relating to Caesar and to Christ (8:2). But nowhere in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* is there anything which might lead to theological confusion, let alone a misidentification of the Father as the Holy Spirit, or something showing such ideas are under discussion from any perspective.

Further on this point, in Clement of Alexandria’s *Instructor* he speaks of Jesus as “the Son of God, the child of the Father.” Clement also writes about “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus,” and then Clement teaches:

He [Jesus] proclaims His Father to be good, and to be the Creator. And that the Creator is just, is not disputed. And again he says, ‘My Father sends the rain on the just, and on the unjust.’ In respect of His sending rain, He is the Creator of the waters, and of the clouds. And in respect of His doing so on all, He holds an even balance justly and rightly. And as being good, he does so on just and unjust alike. ... Our Lord says in His prayer, ‘Our Father, who art in heaven.’ And the heavens belong to Him, who created the world. It is indisputable, then, that the Lord is the Son of the Creator; then the Lord is the Son of Him who is just.

So the understanding of God the Father in relation to the Lord Son appears to have been clearly understood by Clement. Wallace also points out he is not saying such obvious distinctions are never made in the early church fathers, but only “they are not consistently made.” Yet, I have found nothing in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* or in Clement of Alexandria’s writings which supports Wallace’s claim that such distinctions are “not consistently made.”

In fact, Wallace cites only one text from Ignatius (Ephesians 1:1), in which we read of “the blood of God.” But this does not expressly identify the Father with the Son. A simple check of Ignatius’ “habitual use of language” shows he called Jesus “G-god,” but not a “person” of God where in this last expression “God” is the “one” Trinity, a *one what*. Ignatius

---


58 These translations are from the Eerdmans reprint series of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 2, pages 215 and 227-228 (underlining added).


60 According to James White, *The Forgotten Trinity: Recovering the Heart of Christian Belief* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bethany, 1998), page 27, when speaking about the Trinity White believes it is correct for Trinitarians (including Wallace) to say that what is really being talked about is “one what and three who’s.” In other words:

The one *what* is the Being or essence of God; the three *who’s* are the Father, Son, and Spirit. We dare not mix up the *what’s* and *who’s* regarding the Trinity.

The above understanding of “God” as “one what” has nothing to do with the Bible or with any usage of the words for “G-god” in either the Old or the New Testaments. White’s comments above are cited and evaluated in my
maintained a rather clear distinction between the Father and the Son, for he refers to “the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (ὁ πατήρ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ [Ephesians 2:1]), and he talks of singing “to the Father through Jesus Christ” (διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῷ πατρί [Ephesians 4:2]). Ignatius also speaks of those who are joined with God “as the Church is to Jesus Christ, and as Jesus Christ is to the Father” (ὅς ἐκκλησία Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ὁς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τῷ πατρί [Ephesians 5:1]). More clear expressions of personal separation could hardly be expected.

Wallace has misread and misrepresented the early church writings in question on this matter, all apparently so he can sustain the credibility of a “rule” which is broken several times in some of those very same writings (patristics). Indeed, Wallace cites W. Bousset who quotes Ignatius’ letter to the Ephesians 7.2 and his letter to Polycarp 3.2, _neither_ of which say or teach anything about a “naïve modalism” (Bousset). Yet, if they did, then it would mean _they did not know they were teaching it_. Therefore, these writings from the early church fathers could hardly have used a grammatical “rule” to express what (according to Wallace and Bousset) they were not even sure they were writing about!

Both _Martyrdom of Polycarp_ 22.1 and _Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus_ 3.12 are exceptions to Sharp’s first rule. As is the following text from Justin Martyr which I also cited in my 2000 Excursus on Sharp’s rule (see pages 378-380), though Wallace (like the exception in 1 Timothy 6:13) nowhere discusses or even references it in his 2009 _Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin_.

> *Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho, 110.55.*
>
> ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄμπελος καὶ σωτῆρος Χριστοῦ (“... a vine [planted] by God and Savior Christ”).

Here in this new exception which is really an older one since I had given it to Wallace back in 2000, Justin uses two nouns which have become proper names for Jesus, namely, “Savior Christ,” with “Savior” as the first term in the second part of a “Sharp’s rule” construction. Once again, we also see that when “Savior” follows καὶ it is anarthrous, even as part of a clear exception to Sharp’s rule involving the terms “God” and “Christ,” and where only “God” has the article (compare Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1). Wallace ignores this text (as well as 1 Timothy

---


62 The Greek text is from Migne. The fuller reading is, Ἡ γάρ φωτευθείσα ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὄμπελος καὶ σωτῆρος Χριστοῦ, ὁ λαὸς αὐτοῦ ἔστι. Here the pronoun (αὐτοῦ) which follows is singular, as in 2 Timothy 4:1, though speaking of both “God and Christ Jesus” (τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ [see the earlier discussion of the use of “Christ” as a proper name in texts such as Ephesians 5:5, in note 49, pages 17-18]).” The notion here of being such a “vine” rests and remains easiest on the second named subject (“Savior Christ”), for the Father “sent” this one forth as “Savior of the world” (1 John 4:14) and those “planted by God and Savior Christ” are worshippers of God through the name Jesus,” which is Justin’s teaching just prior to the above cited, subject text, after which Justin writes about Jesus’ “second coming.” Therefore, it is also contextually appropriate for Justin to single out one of the two identified subjects for the continuation of his discussion, just as Paul does in 2 Timothy 4:1, and also likely why he/they placed the reference to “Savior Christ”/“Christ Jesus” second, rather than first, in the respective expressions, that is, to continue discussion about only the last-named subject.

I will discuss all of the above texts and others in my separate, pending publication on this subject. Here, though, recall that Wallace’s “‘Sharper’ rule” contends (with my bracketed comments added):

In native Greek constructions (i.e., not translation Greek), when a single article [“excluding ... indefinite pronouns functioning as articles before the second substantive” (Wallace’s 2009 qualification; see his note “2”)] modifies two substantives connected by καὶ (thus, article-substantive-καὶ-substantive), when both substantives are (1) singular (both grammatically and semantically), (2) personal, (3) and common nouns (not proper names or ordinals), they have the same referent.63

Yet, several disputed texts aside (Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1), even the above revised version of Sharp’s rule (hence, the “‘Sharper’ rule”) is contradicted by Smyrnaeans 9, as well as by other texts reviewed in this paper which contain terms of significance equivalent to proper names in terms of their fixed reference, in the first and in the second of the καὶ-joined expressions, and in some cases (including Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1) an actual proper name (“Jesus”) is used along with other terms of fixed significance.

Sharp’s rule has failed to survive numerous evaluations and criticisms as it was originally and subsequently formulated or used by others, and so it has now been revised further by Wallace. Yet, Wallace’s “‘Sharper’ rule” has also failed to survive the presentation of responses, exceptions, and explanations given against the application of Sharp’s rule and the Sharper rule to various NT texts, at least to this point. In large part, then, over time and where it concerns the disputed and other NT texts in particular, Sharp and Wallace have failed to adequately address them all in terms of whether they are exceptions to or examples of Sharp’s rule. In part this is because they do not appear to want to consider “Savior” either alone or in association with an actual proper name such as “Christ Jesus” or simply “Jesus,” as they do or would consider “Lord,” “Lord Jesus,” or even simply “Christ” and also “Lord Jesus Christ.” Another reason is the apparent unwillingness by Sharp or by Wallace and by other Trinitarians to accept the fixed reference and unique semantic significance attached to “God,” that is, to mean “one God, the Father.”—1 Corinthians 8:6.

In closing, I will give what is by a review of the best available evidence at this time the sharpest rule for use in translating Greek constructions which involve the syntax of Sharp’s first rule along with Wallace’s revisions to it. Though I will develop this further in my pending work on this subject, here I will provide a workable definition simply by adding the following qualification given long ago by Winstanley when writing about the exceptions to Sharp’s rule in Aristotle, but always before and still today true where it concerns the interpretation of nearly all if not, in fact, all nouns in a “Sharpe’s rule” or “Sharper’ rule” construction in any writing of any Greek age or dialect:

When the signification of the nouns renders any farther precaution unnecessary, the second article may be omitted, without confounding the distinction of persons.64

---

63 Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 279; Wallace, Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin, page 281.

64 Winstanley, Vindication, page 9 (underlining added).
Such a qualification would not have to mean the article before nouns of “signification” is always omitted, or that inserting an article after a second, third, or more καὶ-joined noun necessarily separates the nouns. As it always should be, the application of such nouns is a question of interpretation according to the best available evidence, of which syntactical patterns in Greek are just a part. The signification of the involved nouns and their use in association with other parts of speech or in the writing or by the writer involved (the author’s “habitual use of language”) should always be considered equally, if not more so, that is, relative to the weight of the evidence provided and available and that pertains to each subject text. Doing so will likely keep Greek grammarians and others from coming up any more rules with so many clear exceptions and an open invitation to find limitations according to a variety of different Greek texts and writers.

However, a proper approach to the interpretation of ancient texts will not likely keep Trinitarians from attempting to use Sharp’s rule or the Sharper rule when interpreting several disputed, christologically significant NT texts, even if the interpretation advanced by those same Trinitarians contradicts the very doctrine Sharp’s rule and the Sharper rule are used to try and further establish. As I will explain further in my pending publication The “Sharpest Rule,” it is precisely such attempted uses which make “Sharp’s rule” Greek’s most tragic grammatical rule.

---

65 See page 13, note 45, for a listing of NT texts which show that an article before the second of such nouns does not necessarily separate the two nouns, as Sharp wrongly claimed in his “Rule VI,” quoted here from Sharp’s Remarks, page xxxvi:

**RULE VI.**

*If they are connected by the copulative, and both have the article, they relate also to different persons.*

However, Sharp (Remarks, page 14-15) even here notes that if “distinct and different actions are intended to be attributed to *one and the same person,* ... *the context must explain or point out* plainly the person to whom the two nouns relate” (underlining added), related to which is an example of a text which Sharp does not want broken by his own rule, namely, John 20:28 (see the First Edition [pages 202-206], Second Edition [pages 350-355], and Third Edition [pages 345-350] of my Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended for a discussion of this text).
APPENDIX

Containing a December 27, 1995 Letter
From Greg Stafford to Dan Wallace
Dan Wallace
Dallas Theological Seminary
3909 Swiss Ave.
Dallas, TX 75204

Dear Dan:

I regret that a heavy schedule has delayed my sending you the material relating to the Granville Sharp controversy that we spoke of a couple weeks back. Are you in possession of the discussions which occurred in several issues of *The Monthly Review or Literary Journal*? If not, I will be glad to send them to you. There are a few matters I would like to discuss with you, particularly in regards to our brief discussion about the different arguments commonly presented against the validity of Sharp's rule.

During our phone conversation I asked what you thought of 1 Timothy 6:13 as an exception to Sharp's rule. You mentioned that you did consider it an exception, in so far as Χριστός Ἱησοῦ is considered a proper name and would therefore not be an exception to the strict form of Sharp's rule. This would also, then, exclude 1 Timothy 5:21 from the strict-form category of Sharp's rule, as well as 2 Timothy 4:1 and perhaps Ephesians 5:5, also.

Another text where we appear to have all the requirements of Sharp's rule is 2 Thessalonians 1:12, κατὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἱησοῦ Χριστοῦ. According to Middleton, "Κύριος Ἰ. Ἱ. is a common title of Christ, and is often used independently of all that precedes it," and, therefore, its occurrence in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 "affords no certain evidence in favor of Mr. Sharp." (*The Doctrine of the Greek Article*, 1833, 381-382) We can see that the writers of the New Testament were familiar with this collective title, and always omit the article when it follows κατὰ. (Rom. 1:7; 15:6; 1 Cor. 1:3; 2 Cor. 1:2; Gal. 1:3; Eph. 1:2; 6:23; Phil. 1:2; 1 Thess. 1:1; 2 Thess. 1:1-2; Phm. 1:3; James 1:1; Jude 4) Yet, when used in non-κατὰ constructions, Κύριος Ἰ. Ἱ. is always articulated. (Acts 15:26; 28:31; Rom. 5:1; 5:11; 15:30; 1 Cor. 1:2, 7-8, 10; 6:11; 15:57; 2 Cor. 1:3; 8:9; 13:13; Gal. 6:14, 18; Eph. 1:3, 17; 5:20; Phil. 4:23; Col. 1:3; 1 Thess. 1:3; 5:9, 23, 28; 2 Thess. 1:12; 2:1, 14; 3:6, 18; 1 Tim. 6:3, 14; Phm. 1:25; James 2:1; 1 Peter 1:3; 2 Peter 1:8, 16; Jude 1:17; 1:21) The only exception appears to be 2 Thessalonians 3:12, ἐν κυρίῳ Ἱησοῦ Χριστῷ.

The New Testament use of Χριστός, Χριστὸς Ἱησοῦ, or Κύριος Ἰ. Ἱ. as equivalents of proper names seems to indicate why, when used in article+noun+κατὰ+noun constructions, or even in noun+κατὰ+noun constructions (e.g., 2 Thess. 1:2), these titles lack the article. Perhaps this is why Robertson is hesitant to apply Sharp's rule to 2 Thessalonians 1:12 and Ephesians 5:5. (large Grammar, p. 786) I am curious, though, why the same could not be true of σωτήρος Ἰ. Ἱ., since, as Alford points out, "σωτήρ was one of those words which gradually dropped the
article and became a quasi proper name. *(The Greek Testament, Vol. 3, p. 420)* Perhaps this is why in BDF (§ 276 (3)) we read, "σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ. may be taken by itself and separated from the preceding."

In answer to this observation, which is also made by Winstanely (Vindication, 1819, pp. 49-50), I gather from our conversation that you would posit that we never find examples of article + noun + καί + proper name (or collective title with the force of a proper name) constructions where both the noun and proper name apply to the same person, and since we have several examples in 2 Peter (1:11; 2:20; 3:18) of this construction which undeniably apply both nouns to the same person, σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ. could not be considered a proper name. However, I believe that rather than being proof that σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ. is not the equivalent of a proper name, and, therefore, not to be placed in the same category as the constructions found in 2 Thessalonians 1:12, 1 Timothy 5:21; 6:13, and 2 Timothy 4:1, that these constructions in 2 Peter show that article + noun + καί + proper name constructions can be applied to one person. The validity of this conclusion is also revealed in Jude 4, where the best authorities read, τῶν μονόν δεσμότητι καὶ κόρον ἡμῶν Ιησοῦν Χριστόν. This text surely affords us an example of an article + noun + καί + proper name construction where both the first noun and the proper name equivalent apply to the same person.

So, it seems to me that the "antecedent probability" you refer to in your article, "The Article-Noun-καί-Noun Plural Construction" *(Grace Theological Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 71)*, is bit more restricted than you suggest when the scope of investigation is limited to those constructions wherein we find the second καί-joined noun to be the equivalent of a proper name. The conclusions we can draw by examining these constructions is that sometimes both the first noun and proper name (or equivalent) are applied to the same person (2 Peter 1:11; 2:20; 3:18; Jude 4), and sometimes they are not (2 Thess. 1:12; 1 Tim. 5:21; 6:13; 2 Tim. 4:1). The question, then, that must be answered, is how do we know when both noun and proper name equivalent are applied to the same person and when they are applied to different persons? And, more to the point, how do we make such a determination in such theologically significant passages as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1? I believe, as you point out in note 25, page 71, of your article on the plural constructions, that arguments presented for either conclusion "must be based on other than syntax," even as Stuart seemed to realize. *(Hints and Cautions Respecting the Greek Article, " Biblical Repository, 1834, Vol. 4, No. 14, pp. 322-325)* We must determine whether the context in article + noun + καί + proper name constructions allows for one or two individuals to be in view. Allow me to present a brief synopsis of the contextual arguments which seem to favor those translations which see two persons referred to in texts such as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1.

The contextual considerations which I would present in favor of a rendering which does not identify τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ as one and the same as σωτήρος ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ. start with the same considerations. Winer was cautioned by: Would Paul (assuming Paul, as I believe, wrote Titus) refer to Jesus as "the great God" when elsewhere (excluding, for the time being, the disputed reference in Romans 9:5, and the reference to Satan in 2 Cor. 4:4) his use of θεός is used exclusively of the Father? Additionally, would he call Jesus "the great God" when elsewhere he says, "for us there is one God, the Father"? (1 Cor. 8:6) What about his reference to the "one God" in 1 Timothy 2:5, where the "one God" is shown in the very same verse to be distinct
from Christ Jesus? How could Paul in Titus 2:13 refer to Jesus as "the great God," when over and over again he makes reference to θεὸς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ? (Eph. 1:17; see also, Rom. 15:6; 2 Cor. 1:3; 11:31; Eph. 1:3) Of course, I am not suggesting that Paul could not have referred to Christ as "the great God" with some lesser connotation, but I cannot see how he could have referred to Christ in an unqualified sense as θεὸς, given the above cited references to the Father as the "one God" of Christians, and in view of his references to this One God being the God of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Also in favor of a two-subject rendering of Titus 2:13 is the fact that τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης, as noted by Abbot ("On The Construction of Titus ii. 13," JBL, Vol. 1, 1881, pp. 4-6), is in perfect accord with Jesus' statement recorded in Matthew 16:27 and mark 8:38, which indicates that the Lord's coming would be a manifestation of both his glory and his Father's. See also the comments of E. F. Scott on page 169 of The Pastoral Epistles, in the Moffatt New Testament Commentary series, on this point.

Regarding 2 Peter 1:1, I believe we have even greater reason to conclude that τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is a reference to two individuals, not one. Not only do we have a reference to θεὸς καὶ σωτήρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ιησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1 Peter 1:3), but in 2 Peter 1:2 we have a clear reference to God and Jesus as distinct individuals. Still, these facts aside, I think there is additional reason to see a reference to two individuals in 2 Peter 1:1, and that reason is found in 2 Peter 1:11, 2:20, and 3:18; verses which are typically used to defend a rendering that makes "God" and "Savior" two titles for Jesus Christ. Let us place them before us so that the difference between these verses and 2 Peter 1:1 becomes manifest.

2PE 1:1 τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

2PE 1:11 τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.


2PE 3:18 τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

Now, don't you find it a bit unusual that Peter (assuming, as I believe, that Peter wrote 2 Peter) would use this construction to refer to Jesus as θεὸς in 2 Peter 1:1, and then when he employs this same construction another three times throughout his second letter he chooses an entirely different title? I do. Especially since he, in addition to the above, refers to Christ as κύριος at 1 Peter 1:3, 2:3, 2:13, 3:15, 2 Peter 1:2, 8, 14, 16, and 3:2, a total of 12 times. Yet, nowhere else does he use θεὸς of Jesus. Still, in spite of that fact, and Peter's significant statement at 1 Peter 1:3, the distinction he makes between God and Jesus in 2 Peter 1:2, and his preference for predicating κύριος of Jesus and θεὸς of the Father, which he does 45 times if we exclude 2 Peter 1:1 (1 Peter 1:2-3, 5, 21 (twice), 23; 2:4-5, 10, 12, 15-17, 19-20, 3:4-5, 17-18, 20-22; 4:2, 6, 10-11 (three times), 14, 16-17 (twice), 19; 5:2 (twice), 5-6, 10, 12; 2 Peter 1:2, 17, 21; 2:4, 3:5, 12), we are told that he broke from his preference of calling Jesus κύριος and, instead, gave him the title that he elsewhere uses exclusively of the Father? The evidence for such a conclusion, which rests solely on the absence of the article before σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ
Χριστὸς, appears very slim when these facts are given due consideration. Of course, we should not overlook the fact that the repetition of the article before the second noun would not necessarily indicate a reference to two individuals anyway, as the constructions in John 13:13 and 2 John 7 reveal.

I know you must have a heavy schedule, but I would be curious to know what contextual arguments you think would support a translation that makes Θεός a predicate of Jesus in Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1, as well as any thoughts you have on the above information. Also, if your schedule allows, I would greatly appreciate having a copy of C. Kuehne's articles in the *Journal of Theology* 13(3, 4), 14(1, 2, 3, 4), and 15(1, 2). I would be happy to reimburse you for any expenses you incur in sending me these articles, should your schedule allow it.

With thanks for your giving consideration to these matters, I remain,

Yours sincerely,

Greg Stafford