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Elihu continued and said:

“Bear with me a little, and I will show you, for I have yet something to say on God’s behalf.”
—Job 36:1-2 (NRSV)

Another Exception to *Granville Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*

A Further Response to Dan Wallace
(With an Appendix)

Greg Stafford**

The Greek grammatical rule known most commonly today as “Sharp’s rule” was actually one of several rules proposed by Englishman and author Granville Sharp in his 1798 publication, *Remarks on the Use of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament: Containing Many New Proofs of the Divinity of Christ, from Passages Which are Wrongly Translated in the Common English Version*.¹

The most popular of Sharp’s “rules” is his “Rule I.” Many who are familiar with Sharp’s work often credit him alone for this rule when it comes to its potential application to certain christologically significant texts in the NT. However, there is still some question about whether it is truly Granville Sharp who is to be credited for his most famous rule’s use in many of these same NT texts which involve the Greek terms for “God” and for “Christ.”² In any case, for the

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¹ Though the title of Sharp’s work is in all capital letters in my version, given its length I have rendered the title as above so that it is easier to read. I am using my copy of the first American edition published in Philadelphia by B.B. Hopkins in 1807. This is the same edition which I used in my two previously published writings on the subject of Sharp’s rule (see my *Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended: An Answer to Scholars and Critics*, First [1998] and Second [2000] Editions published by Elihu Books, pages 221-248 and pages 367-410, respectively). See the link in note 37.

² In Wallace’s writings he notes that while Sharp’s first published edition of his first rule was in 1798, the 1798 publication contains Sharp’s claim to have earlier produced the first 24 pages in a letter to “an unnamed minister friend” dated June 10, 1778, a full 20 years before Sharp actually published his rules! See Daniel B. Wallace, “The Article with Multiple Substantives Connected by Καί in the New Testament: Semantics and Significance” (Ph.D. dissertation: Dallas Theological Seminary, 1995), page 42, note 52; Wallace, “Granville Sharp: A Model of Evangelical Scholarship and Social Activism,” *JETS* 41.4 (December, 1998), page 604; Wallace, *Granville Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin: Semantics and Significance*, ed., D.A. Carson, *Studies in Biblical Greek*, vol. 14 (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), page 48, note 76. Though Wallace follows Sharp’s lead by claiming that in his letter to “an unnamed” friend Sharp laid down “all six rules ... with several examples,” there is insufficient evidence for this because (with underlining added) in addition to Sharp not having the name of his “friend”:

Sharp’s usual practice was to make an ἀντίγραφον [*antigraphon*, “copy”] of his letters. On this occasion, however, Sharp “had not leisure to copy the original letter” and, after repeated attempts to retrieve it over a span of several years, was able to obtain only a part of it [Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 48, note 76.]

At the end of his above quoted comments Wallace refers to page 24 of Sharp’s published *Remarks*, on which page there is the following final paragraph by “G. S.” (Granville Sharp), originally all in italics:

purposes of the present paper (which include reviewing some of the history involved in the discussion, presentation, and use of Sharp's first rule in order to present a clearer listing of some of the more significant, existing exceptions and also to present yet another exception to Sharp's *Canon and its Kin*), here is Sharp's "Rule I.":

When two personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative και ["and"], if the former has the definitive article, and the latter has not, they both relate to the same person, ...³

The remainder of this letter is lost. The author [Granville Sharp] had not leisure to copy the original letter before he sent it to the gentlemen to whom it was addressed, and therefore he requested him to return it as soon as he had perused and considered it; but the gentleman neglected this request; and the author [Granville Sharp], after several years' solicitation, obtained only a part of the letter, (as far as is here copied,) and the remainder (which was written on a separate half-sheet) he has never yet been able to recover. He had however a short memorandum of the several texts, which were explained in the latter part of the letter; and, having since had favourable opportunities of examining the said texts, and of copying them very accurately from the ancient Alexandrian manuscript in the British Museum, he has been enabled to make some short remarks on the versions of all of the said texts, which may serve as a sufficient Supplement to this imperfect letter. Some notes have been added to this printed copy which were not in the original letter.

From Sharp to Wallace, this all sounds very strange where it concerns the true origin of Sharp's "Rule I." Indeed, Sharp himself is unable to account for the originality of his letter dated June 10, 1778, in ways which are suspicious at best. While it is possible that Sharp's account of his original, now lost "rules" is correct there is also the possibility that Sharp was *not* the first one to put forth a rule like his now famous "Rule I." According to John Pye Smith (1774-1851) who, like Sharp, was for good reasons an anti-slavery advocate as well as the "son of a Sheffield bookseller, ... surrounded by books in his youth and, practically self-taught, [who] rose not only to become a dissenting academic and author, but through his interest in science and geology, was elected to become the first Fellow of the Royal Society from a nonconformist background" (from the online article, "John Pye-Smith" [link: <http://en.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/4208084>; last accessed on January 17, 2011]), it was Utrecht Professor of Divinity Dr. Royaards (in his *Divinitate Iesu Christi Vera*) who first published the following three rules as early as 1792 (see my further review of Royaard's presentation of these rules in my forthcoming publication, *The 'Sharpest Rule': A Review and Restatement of Greek's Most Tragic Rule*):

Where designations of God and Christ occur, united by the copulative conjunction, they *must* be understood of two persons when the article is prefixed to *both*; they *may* be understood of two when the article is prefixed to *neither*: but, when the article is prefixed to the first and not repeated before the second, they *must* be referred to *one and the same* person. This is the constant usage of the New Testament writers. [J.P. Smith, *The Scripture Testimony to the Messiah: An Inquiry With a View to a Satisfactory Determination of the Doctrine Taught in the Holy Scriptures Concerning the Person of Christ*, vol. III, Second Edition (London: Holdsworth and Ball, 1829), page 344.]

While not the same as Sharp's "Rule I." the last stated "rule" does similarly pertain to many of the same texts. That is why at the end of his recitation of Royaards' rules Smith has a note in which he refers to "*Royaards Diatribe de Div. Jesu Chr.* par. ii. p. 154," as his source, noting further, "It is to be observed that this brief but valuable work was published several years before Mr. Sharp's Letters" (underlining added). However, it may also be the case that Sharp sent out some earlier version of his "Rule I." which was in his opinion insufficient to publish, but which was not much at all like what became his "Rule I." Indeed, by Sharp's own recounting of what he "had written on the same subject" to his unnamed "friend," Sharp was not comfortable enough to send out his earlier letter to anyone else until his unnamed "friend" wrote in response for, as Sharp put it, "lest it [the answer from Sharp's unnamed 'friend'] should oblige me to make any alterations in my rules; and so, indeed, it had proved; for, he objected to my first rule, (as it was then stated,) and has cited several exceptions to it" (Sharp, *Remarks*, pages 1-2; underlining added). Therefore, what Sharp sent out before his published *Remarks* was by his own admission *not* the same as the "Rule I." Sharp published in 1798. In can also be fairly said that Sharp has made it impossible for us to know what he truly sent out to his unnamed "friend" by not simply making a copy of the letter according to his "usual practice."

³ Sharp, *Remarks* (1807), page 3. Sharp's expanded version of this rule is given on page 3 of his tract exactly as follows (with no italics at the end):

This rule, as quoted above and according to its larger form in note 3, was given its first exceptions by none other than Granville Sharp in the very same publication in which he first presented his rules. According to Sharp:

[T]here is no exception or instance of the like mode of expression, that I know of, which necessarily requires a construction different from what is here laid down, EXCEPT the nouns be proper names, or in the plural number; in which cases there are many exceptions;⁴

Since the publication of Sharp's *Remarks*, what is and what is not an "exception" to what has come to be known as "Sharp's rule" continues to create questions with few complete or even credible answers in return, with the result that over two hundred years later there is still great confusion among many. Wallace has noted misrepresentations of Sharp's rule in the grammars and works of Trinitarian scholars including A.T. Robertson, H.E. Dana and J.R. Mantey, and Kenneth Wuest.⁵ More recently, several non-Trinitarian works have also misused or misstated (or both) Sharp's rule.⁶

When the copulative καὶ ["and"] connects two nouns of the same case, [viz. nouns (either substantive or adjective, or participles) of personal description, respecting office, dignity, affinity, or connexion [sic], and attributes, properties, or qualities, good or ill,] if the article ὁ, or any of its cases, precedes the first of the said nouns or participles, and is not repeated before the second noun or participle, the latter always relates to the same person that is expressed or described by the first noun or participle: i.e. it denotes a farther description of the first-named person.

⁴ Sharp, *Remarks* (1807), pages 5-6 (italics and all capitals original; underlining added). Note also page 121, where though on his page xxxv and on his page 3 Sharp does *not* clearly exclude proper names he nonetheless writes in his "Fourth Appendix" as if he "expressly excluded [*proper names*] from the first rule." While Sharp does exclude proper names on his page 6, for reasons which are not clear "proper names" are not expressly excluded from the formal statements of Sharp's rule given in Sharp's *Remarks*.

⁵ These works are cited in full along with some other works which have not accurately stated or used Sharp's rule in Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," pages 68-73; see also Wallace, "Granville Sharp: A Model of Evangelical Scholarship and Social Activism," page 610, note 109; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 73-78. Ironically, though Wallace notes A.T. Robertson's misuse of Sharp's rule when applying it to impersonal nouns (see Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," pages 69-70; Wallace, "Granville Sharp: A Model of Evangelical Scholarship and Social Activism," page 610; *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 72), Wallace still quotes with approval Robertson's concluding remarks about Sharp's rule, namely, "Sharp stands vindicated after all the dust has settled" (Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," pages 69, note 142; Wallace, "Granville Sharp: A Model of Evangelical Scholarship and Social Activism," page 610, note 104; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 72, note 63;), in spite of the fact that Robertson helped dirty the air of understanding by applying the rule to impersonal nouns, and though he (like Wallace) wrongfully criticizes Winer's discussion of several Sharp's rule texts (see note 50).

⁶ Two relatively recent misrepresentations of "Sharp's rule" are connected with the publications of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society. The first involves the Watchtower Society's own 1984 *New World Translation* (NWT) Reference Bible (Brooklyn: New York) and its 1985 *Kingdom Interlinear Translations* (KIT). Though the Watchtower Society also provided an appendix discussing Titus 2:13 in its 1969 KIT (see page 1163) and in its 1950 NWT New Testament (see pages 783-785), only the NWT1984 (see Appendix 6E, pages 1581-1582) and the KIT1985 (see Appendix 2E, pages 1143-1144) reference and discuss the article written in 1881 by Ezra Abbot, "On the Construction of Titus ii. 13," *JBL* 1, pages 3-19. While Abbot's article is excellent in many ways, as I have shown previously (see my *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended*, First Edition, pages 229, 238-241, 243; *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended*, Second Edition, pages 377-378, 387, 389, 398, 401), Abbot does mistakenly include plural nouns as examples of exceptions to "Sharp's rule" in texts such as Matthew 21:12, where we read of "those selling and those buying" (τοὺς πωλοῦντας καὶ ἀγοράζοντας). It should be kept in mind, however, that Abbot does not appear to cite this text as an absolute exception to Sharp's rule but only to further illustrate how, at times, in both Greek and in English, an article may be omitted from one noun versus another (whether they are plural or singular), that is, when "it is safely left to the intelligence of the reader to distinguish them" (Abbot, "On the Construction of Titus ii. 13," page 14). But the Watchtower Society's highlighting and use of Abbot's remarks on the plural nouns in

Part of the problem with the continued misunderstanding of Sharp's rule is due to Sharp's own lack of clarity in several respects. For example, the formal statements of Sharp's "Rule I." do not themselves include all of the limitations which Sharp put upon his rule in the body of his *Remarks*. Even when such further limitations are placed on the rule by Sharp in his publication, they are still not always clear (compare the underlined portion of Gregory Blunt's similar complaint to Sharp concerning this point in relation to proper names, quoted in my note 11).

Indeed, Wallace claims that on page 120 of Sharp's *Remarks* that Sharp "explicitly" states "impersonal constructions are within the purview of his second, third, fifth, and sixth rules, but not the first."⁷ Yet, eleven (11) years earlier in 1983 Wallace published the following:

Durham and Rider believe that Sharp did *not* exclude impersonal constructions. Although this point is ancillary to the subject of this paper, I believe that Durham and Rider have misread Sharp, for Sharp explicitly states that he accepts the impersonal constructions as fitting the second, third, fifth, and sixth rules, but not the first or fourth [referring to Sharp's page 120].⁸

The above demonstrates just how *unclear* Sharp was in formulating and in presenting his rules, for in 1983 even Wallace misread Sharp's page 120 to mean, "Sharp explicitly states that he

Matthew 21:12 has contributed to the misunderstanding about plural nouns and "Sharp's rule." Many other sections of Abbot's article could have been used to show the inapplicability of Sharp's rule to texts such as Titus 2:13, that is, rather than cite Abbot's illustrative use of and comments on Matthew 21:12 (see, for examples, the references to my First and Second Editions of *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended* earlier in this note, as well as my forthcoming "*Sharpest Rule*" book for additional discussion of Abbot's "On the Construction of Titus ii. 13" *JBL* article). Similarly, Jason David BeDuhn in his *Truth in Translation: Accuracy and Bias in English Translations of the New Testament* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2003), page 91, cites Titus 1:4 as "the closest parallel to Titus 2:13"! But Titus 1:4 is not the closest parallel, nor even a close parallel to Titus 2:13, that is, in terms of its syntax. As it relates to the use of "Savior," Titus 1:4 is relevant to the use of the same term in Titus 2:13. However, BeDuhn's citation of 2 Thessalonians 1:12 is a closer (even, perhaps, "the closest" NT) parallel to texts such as Titus 2:13, since it contains similar nouns and an explicitly *named* subject ("Jesus") in a "Sharp's rule" construction. BeDuhn also does not explain the full significance of these and other parallels. Indeed, BeDuhn refers only to Wallace's 1983 article from *Grace Theological Journal* (cited more fully in my note 8) and BeDuhn badly misstates Sharp's rule on page 92 of his book as follows:

Those who defend the translations that read as if only Jesus is spoken of in both Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1 attempt to distinguish those two passages from the parallel examples I have given by something called "Sharp's Rule." In 1798, the amateur theologian Granville Sharp published a book in which he argued that when there are two nouns of the same form ("case") joined by "and" (*kai*), only the first of which has the article, the nouns are identified as the same thing. Close examination of this much-used "rule" shows it to be a fiction concocted by a man who had a theological agenda in creating it, namely, to prove that the verses we are examining in this chapter call Jesus "God" [BeDuhn, *Truth in Translation*, page 92].

BeDuhn has not rightly represented Sharp or his rule in the above. In fact, BeDuhn (*Truth in Translation*, page 93) even uses Wallace's 1983 article on plural nouns in the Sharp construction to support his claim that "there is no evidence that anything significant for the meaning of the words happens merely by being joined by 'and' and dropping the second article"! Yet, neither Wallace's 1983 article nor his writings since then provide any evidence in support of BeDuhn's claims here. Unfortunately, BeDuhn has misread both Sharp and Wallace on this matter with the result that, together with NWT1984's and KIT1985's misuse of Abbot's article, many non-Trinitarians have been misinformed when it comes to the definition and the application of "Sharp's rule."

⁷ Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," page 47 (italics original; underlining added); Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 52; Wallace, "Granville Sharp: A Model of Evangelical Scholarship and Social Activism," page 606.

⁸ Daniel B. Wallace, "The Semantic Range of the Article-Noun-καί-Noun Plural Construction in the New Testament," *Grace Theological Journal* 4.1 (spring, 1983), page 66, note 12 (italics original; underlining added). In "Multiple Substantives," page 47, note 71, and in *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 52, note 93, Wallace corrects the reference to Sharp's page 121, where Sharp makes plain that he does not include "personal nouns" in his fourth rule.

accepts impersonal constructions as fitting ... not the *first or fourth*” rules laid down by Sharp. In his 1995 doctoral dissertation and in his 2009 *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin* publication Wallace changed his reading of Sharp's page 120 so that, as noted earlier, by 1995 Wallace was prepared only to read Sharp's page 120 as not including impersonal constructions “within the purview of his ... *first*” rule (underlining added); the reference to the “fourth” rule in Wallace's 1983 article is omitted in Wallace's 1995 dissertation, from his 1998 *JETS* article on Granville Sharp, and in his 2009 Peter Lang publication on this subject.

Sharp did not clearly or expressly exclude impersonal nouns from his first rule, and he did not “explicitly” state on his page 120 that impersonal constructions do not fit the requirements of either his first or fourth rules, as Wallace previously claimed.⁹ Wallace's 1983, 1995, 1998, and 2009 descriptions are *inaccurate* representations of what Sharp wrote in his *Remarks*, page 120, for on that page Sharp says nothing about his first rule being inapplicable to impersonal nouns (though Sharp does reference his first rule briefly on his page 121, in connection with the exclusion of proper names).¹⁰

Since he refers only to “personal” nouns in formal statements of his rule, Sharp does appear to have understood a limitation or exclusion for impersonal nouns from his first rule.¹¹ However, Sharp's lack of clarity where it concerns the limitations of his rules can also be seen in his

⁹ Wallace's 1995 and 2009 corrections to his 1983 article in relation to Sharp's Rule IV are appropriate, since Sharp's fourth rule (*Remarks* [1807], page xxxvi) reads:

RULE IV.

If the nouns are not personal, they relate to different things or qualities.

¹⁰ Sharp quotes Gregory Blunt, *Six More Letters to Granville Sharp, Esq. on His Remarks upon the Uses of the Article in the Greek Testament* (London: J. Johnson, 1803), page 43, regarding Blunt's claim that “many of the examples ... in your *second, third, and fifth* rules, and the majority of those in the *sixth*, consist of nouns which are not *personal*.” Sharp then responds on his page 120 with references only to his “2d” and “3d rules,” and to his “fifth and sixth rules,” but not to his first *or* fourth rules.

¹¹ According to Wallace (“Multiple Substantives,” pages 47-48) on pages 140-142 of his *Remarks* Sharp “chastises [Gregory] Blunt for bringing in impersonal constructions as exceptions to the rule.” While it is true that Blunt used examples such as Luke 14:21 (involving plural, impersonal nouns [“broad ways” and “streets”]), part of the problem involves both a lack of clarity by Sharp on points of exclusion or limitation concerning his rule (such as for proper nouns and for plurals) which are not stated expressly as part of his Rule I. (or separately on page xxxv or page 3 of Sharp's *Remarks*), as well as a lack of clarity by Sharp about *why* such nouns were excluded in the first place. Indeed, note Blunt's complaint to Sharp on this point:

In *proper names*, perhaps, you may discover something which, at first sight, seems to afford ground for a particular distinction between them and other nouns. ... but even this is no ground for a general limitation, or for making a difference between proper names, and *all* nouns descriptive of office, dignity, &c.: for of these latter, there are many which express diversity as strongly and as necessarily as any proper names whatever can possibly do. Thus, for instance, *king and queen, husband and wife, &c.* with all those which I mentioned in my former letter, and many more that might be mentioned, are as different as *Sharp and Blunt*. If, then, proper names are beyond the reach of your rule, because they, by their nature indicate diversity, so likewise must all such personal nouns as these, be, which, by their nature are equally indicative of diversity. Before, therefore, you can proscribe such examples as consist of proper names from being brought against your rule, you must reduce that rule to narrower limits, and confine its operation, not merely to personal nouns, but to personal nouns of one sort only. And then, in the next place, before you can apply your rule to the proposed correction of our common version in those texts you have selected, you must shew [sic] that *χριστος* [sic: “Christ”], *κυριος* [“Lord”], and *σωτηρ* [“Savior”], as applied to Jesus, differ less widely from *ὁ θεος* [“the God” or “God”] and *ὁ μεγας θεος* [“the great God”], then one proper name does from another. And when you have done this, it will then be a proper subject of inquiry, whether such a circumstance affords sufficient ground for maintaining that *personal nouns, even of this sort, are differently affected by the article and by conjunction from proper names.* [Blunt, *Six More Letters to Granville Sharp*, pages 40, 41-42; underlining added; italics original.]

treatment of plural nouns. That is why in his 1983 article Wallace wrote the following about Sharp's claims concerning plural constructions:

Sharp does not clearly state that his rule is applicable only in the singular. Such a conclusion may be at best only inferred via an argument from silence (i.e., in stating that “*the latter always relates to the same person . . .* i.e. it denotes a farther description of the first-named person,” Sharp only refers to the singular). However, a perusal of his monograph reveals that he insisted on the singular in order for the rule to apply absolutely.¹²

In addition to Sharp's own accepted exceptions to his rule, which at the very least include impersonal nouns, proper nouns, and plural nouns, Wallace accepts the following as further exceptions to Sharp's first “rule”:

- 1) **Generic Nouns**: Nouns (substantives) applied in a general or universal sense, that is, without any specific, singularly personal application of the noun.

Example: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1148a.

τόν σῶφρονα καὶ ἀκόλαστον
 (“the disciplined and undisciplined [man]”).¹³

With such exceptions in mind, Wallace quotes Winstanley's insightful evaluation of these exceptions to Sharp's rule from Aristotle, namely (as quoted by Wallace), “the nouns, though personal, are used in a general or universal sense.” Wallace then continues his quotation of Winstanley as follows: “In this respect, it must be confessed, they differ materially from those of which you [i.e., Sharp] would correct the common version; and so far may be thought inapplicable” Now here is the full paragraph from Winstanley, inclusive of the parts which I just quoted from Wallace (but with my underlining added):

In all the above-cited passages from Aristotle, the nouns, though personal, are used in a general or universal sense. In this respect, it must be confessed, they differ materially from those of which you would correct the common version; and so far may be thought inapplicable to our present purpose. But they are not totally inapplicable; as they prove that when the signification of the nouns renders any farther precaution unnecessary, the second article may be omitted, without confounding the distinction of persons. They prove also that the article may be understood after the copulative; for the same author as frequently repeats it with similar nouns ... sometimes he omits it altogether, and in the same sense¹⁴

In fact, though Wallace omits a large part of Winstanley's comments on these texts, and though Wallace ignores Winstanley's “signification of the nouns” argument (likely, as I will show later in this paper, because such a “signification of the nouns” argument also directly

¹² Wallace, “Semantic Range,” page 63 (underlining added).

¹³ Cited first with other, similar exceptions from Aristotle in response to Sharp's *Remarks* by Calvin Winstanley, *A Vindication of Certain Passages in the Common English Version of the New Testament. Addressed to Granville Sharp, Esq.* (Cambridge: University Press—Hilliard and Metcalf, 1819), page 9). Cited also in Wallace, (“Multiple Substantives,” page 123, and in Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 122), along with other examples of generic nouns in Aristotle. The first edition of Winstanley's work was published in 1805. As in my prior two treatments on this subject, here I will quote only from Winstanley's 1819 edition.

¹⁴ Winstanley, *Vindication*, page 9.

impacts every other example of Sharp's rule involving 'nouns of signification,' as I will discuss further in my forthcoming "*Sharpest Rule*" publication), Wallace concedes that Winstanley's exceptions "modify Sharp's rule" so that both "nouns which are plural syntactically and those which are plural *semantically* (i.e., generic nouns) are not within the purview of the rule."¹⁵

- 2) **Enumeration:** The 'stringing' together of two, three, or more nouns ("multiple substantives").¹⁶

Example: Herodotus, *The Histories* 4.71.

τὸν οἰνοχόον καὶ μάγειρον καὶ ἵπποκόμον καὶ διήκονον καὶ ἀγγελιηφόρον
("the drink-bringer and the cook and the groom and the servant and the messenger").¹⁷

As Wallace put it, Bishop Thomas Fanshaw Middleton "had quite a bit of difficulty with" this text.¹⁸ So, too, has Wallace "had quite a bit of difficulty with" this text, I will argue. The reason is obvious, as stated by Winstanley in his response to Middleton, "Surely, Dr. M. can never consider it as equally improbable that the same person should exercise five different offices!"¹⁹ The problem for Wallace, as it was for Middleton, is how to explain this text in relation to Sharp's rule, when the syntax fits Sharp's first rule but where the "signification of the nouns" clearly means more to the proper interpretation of the text than does the presence or absence of the article in a "Sharp's rule" construction.

Ironically, what constitutes the first 8 words of Wallace's 1995 doctoral dissertation also describe what Wallace admits "might" further refine Sharp's rule, namely, "*The Article with*

¹⁵ Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," page 123; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 123. Wallace, however, goes so far as to accept that these generic exceptions may cause him to "modify [Wallace's] 'head count' within the NT" for Sharp's rule constructions, which would eliminate 24 of the examples cited by Wallace in his Appendix to his 1995 dissertation (see pages 283-289) and from Wallace's 2009 publication (see pages 287-301). (**Note:** In his 1995 dissertation [see page 124, note 112] Wallace references "eighty constructions fitting Sharp's rule" in the NT, though he numbers only "78" in his 1995 dissertation's Appendix; in Wallace's 2009 book on Sharp's rule [see page 123, note 67] Wallace corrects this number to "seventy-nine," matching his 2009 book's Appendix.) But Wallace does *not* remove the 24 examples he acknowledges involve "generic substantives" from his NT tabulation(s) for reasons given in his 1995 dissertation on page 124, note 112, and in note 67 on page 123 of his 2009 *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, which reasons I will discuss further in my forthcoming "*Sharpest Rule*" publication, as the primary purposes of this paper involve a review of the different exceptions to "Sharp's rule," responses to certain related issues, and to introduce yet another exception to *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*.

¹⁶ Wallace defines "enumeration" as "instances in which three or more nouns are strung together" ("Multiple Substantives," page 128; *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 127).

¹⁷ Cited first in response to Sharp's *Remarks* by Winstanley (see *Vindication*, Appendix, page 53).

¹⁸ Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," page 127; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 127. Wallace is referring to Middleton's 1841 version of *The Doctrine of the Greek Article* (London: J.G.F. & J. Rivington), page 66. According to "Multiple Substantives," page 62, note 118, and *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 65, note 39, Wallace quoted only from this later edition of Middleton's work. While I have copies of both the original 1808 edition and Middleton's 1841 edition, in this paper where I interact with Wallace's use of Middleton I will quote and address only Middleton's 1841 edition, the edition cited and used by Wallace.

¹⁹ Winstanley, *Vindication*, Appendix, page 53.

Multiple Substantives Connected by Καί!”²⁰ Herodotus’ *Histories* 4.71 contains such an obvious exception to “Sharp’s rule” that, to quote Wallace, “where several [or, ‘multiple’] nouns are involved in the construction,” in light of *Histories* 4.71, “it may or may not follow the rule.”²¹ Winstanley’s rejoinder to Middleton’s attempted use of enumeration long before Wallace as it relates to *Histories* 4.71, still stands without a complete, credible response:

Lastly, the Dr. says, ‘it has subsequently occurred to him, that the several nouns μαγειρον [“cook”], ἵπποκομον [“groom”], &c. may want the article by’ what he calls ‘Enumeration.’ What power this has to extricate any passage from the operation of Mr. Sharp’s rule, we cannot see: but we can see that it is just as easy for Unitarians to call the disputed texts (Ephes. v. 5. Tit. ii. 13. &c) *enumeration*, as it is for the Dr. to call this passage of Herodotus by that name. Whether there be any thing more in the term than a *mere* name, our readers will have an opportunity of determining for themselves when we come to speak of the Doctor’s anomalies, of which enumeration makes one.²²

Instead of accepting without controversy that this example fits and excepts Sharp’s first rule, Wallace chooses to write in defense of Middleton’s concept of enumeration in relation to this text *after* Wallace first conveniently limits his concept of “enumeration” to “three or more nouns” (see note 16),²³ followed by this explanation for *Histories* 4.71:

²⁰ Indeed, whether Wallace did so intentionally because of texts such as *Histories* 4.71, or primarily for some other reason, the title *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin* at least does not carry with it a title concerning a Greek “rule” involving “multiple substantives connected by καί” which is so expressly contradicted by Herodotus!

²¹ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 130; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 128.

²² Winstanley, *Vindication*, Appendix, pages 53-54.

²³ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 128, and in *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 127, cites Middleton’s 1841 edition of *The Doctrine of the Greek Article*, pages 99-100, claiming that there Middleton “dealt with” this concept of “enumeration” involving “three or more nouns strung together.” According to Wallace, “in that section [on pages 99-100] Middleton noted that even the best authors did not follow their normal practice with reference to the article.” But for Wallace this is not supposed to be about “the article” before certain types of nouns, but about “Sharp’s rule.” Winstanley already effectively answered Middleton on this point by noting (see Winstanley, *Vindication*, Appendix, page 54), “it is just as easy for Unitarians to call [two of] the disputed texts (Ephes. v. 5. Tit. ii. 13. &c) *enumeration*, as it is for the Dr. to call this passage of Herodotus by that name.” This may also be in part what motivated Wallace to question even the use of a *second* epithet, “in some respects,” as “really not required” (Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 128, note 126; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 127, note 83). Wallace largely ignores Winstanley’s reply on this point, deferring instead to Middleton’s and to two other grammars’ discussion of “the phenomenon of enumeration”:

Middleton noted that even the best authors did not follow their normal practice with reference to the article. Other grammarians also point out the problem of enumeration, noting, in effect, that in lists of three or more terms, there is a greater tendency to omit the article when it would otherwise be appropriate [Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 128; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 127.]

Yet, in Middleton’s entire discussion of “Anomalies” (which begins on page 98 and ends page 101 of his 1841 edition) there is not even one example given which involves the “problem of enumeration” in a Sharp’s rule construction! Here is what Middleton illustrates in his chapter on “Anomalies”: 1) Nouns which otherwise might have the article prefixed to them “become anarthrous” when used after prepositions and so “their definiteness or indefiniteness ... must be determined on other grounds” (pages 98-99); 2) “where several Nouns are coupled together by Conjunctions” or where “the Conjunctions are omitted” but where “the nouns would, if they stood singly, require the Article, yet when thus brought together, they very frequently reject it” (which Middleton here calls “Enumeration” on his page 99, and which Middleton also applies on his page 100 to “where there are only two” [underlining added] nouns, just as we have in most of Sharp’s and Wallace’s examples!); 3) “in a series of things of the same class only one can be *first*, one *second*, ... Ordinals [= a number which is a part of a series of numbers],

A linguistic reason can be given for this phenomenon as well. When TSKS [article-substantive-καί-substantive] fits the rule, the second substantive either further identifies or describes or clarifies something about the first. If so, then typically a *third* epithet would be superfluous. Unless there are special contextual reasons for the third being there—in particular, to *stress* the multi-functional character of the person in view, we might in fact normally expect enumerations to indicate more than one individual.²⁴

This explanation by Wallace does not effectively answer the question about why *Histories* 4.71 contains the very syntax Sharp and Wallace would likely otherwise (but for it being an exception!) include as part of *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, though the nouns are applied to *different* persons. Wallace simply claims the use of “a *third* epithet would be superfluous” and then sets up his own “special contextual reasons for the third [substantive] being there.” Indeed, Wallace cites the enumerated string of more than two substantives (three) from

however, for the most part, whether the Nouns, with which they agree, be expressed or understood, are anarthrous” (page 100). Middleton then gives the following note:

It is not meant, that this practice, any more than the preceding, is without exception: Ordinals not unfrequently [*sic*] take the Article. The reason of the irregularity seems to be, that while their natural definiteness gives them a right to the Article, it at the same time renders the Article unnecessary. [Middleton, *The Doctrine of the Greek Article*, page 100, note 1; underlining added.]

Indeed, I believe this is also what we have in other texts with other nouns’ “natural definiteness” at times ‘rendering the article unnecessary.’ Middleton concludes his discussion of “Anomalies” by 4) “superlatives” such as “first” and “last” which have “so close an affinity to the Ordinals” that they “also sometimes reject the Article.” However, again, not one of the anomalous uses of the Greek article in Middleton’s discussion is illustrated in a Sharp’s rule construction. Indeed, as Wallace appears to concede when it comes to texts such as *Histories* 4.71, it is often more or equally a question of the *usage of the substantive with or without the article* and any “natural definiteness” such nouns otherwise may have as a result of their use for persons in article-substantive-καί-substantive constructions than it is about the syntax of the involved and accepted parts of speech. That is why if “the great God” is a fixed description for the Father in Titus 2:13 its “natural definiteness” makes it impossible to identify him further as the “Savior Jesus Christ” (compare note 50), even for Trinitarians! Wallace also claims other grammarians “point out the problem of enumeration, noting, in effect, that in lists of three or more terms, there is a greater tendency to omit the article when it would otherwise be appropriate.” This, too, however, could simply be another instance or type of “natural definiteness” for listed items, but once more it is not merely a question of the use or absence of the article but of its presence or absence in a “Sharp’s rule” construction. Wallace gets sidetracked on other grammarians’ comments on the former when he is supposed to be explained *Histories* 4.71 in relation to the latter. Further, as Winstanley already observed, there is nothing in Middleton’s (Wallace’s) explanation which would keep the very texts where there is a dispute from being subject to the same principle of enumeration and, hence, also potentially explainable on the basis of the presence or absence of the article in this light in texts such as Titus 2:13. Indeed, Samuel G. Green, in his *Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek Testament*, Revised (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1912), page 198, lists Titus 2:13 in his discussion and illustration of “Combined Enumeration” along with other texts such as Ephesians 3:18, Colossians 2:22, 2 Peter 1:10, and Matthew 17:1, *all* of which are excluded from Sharp’s first rule! This shows that, apart from Middleton and Wallace, some who were neutral or who slightly favored a translation of Titus 2:13 calling Jesus “the great God” (as Green does) include the text in the category of “enumeration” and so thereby also make Titus 2:13 and texts like it subject to an important, further revision to Wallace’s revision to Sharp’s rule in light of exceptions to it such as *Histories* 4.71, namely, from “where *several* nouns are involved in the construction it may or may not follow the rule” (= Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 130; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 128) to what it should be, that is, “where [two or more] nouns are involved in the construction it may or may not follow the rule.” Of course, this would then release the whole matter again to translators’ understanding of common syntax patterns (such as article-substantive-καί-substantive) involving nouns of all types, used in particular contexts by different authors, all of which must be considered in determining the meaning of a text, even more so now in light of the clear exceptions to Sharp’s first rule and to “its kin.”

²⁴ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 128-129 (underlining added); Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 127-128.

Philippians 2:25, where all three Sharp's rule nouns apply to one person without being "superfluous."²⁵

However, it should be noted that in abandoning "Sharp's rule" when it comes to this text (*Histories* 4.71), Wallace believes it is appropriate to do so not because of the grammar, but because of (with my emphasis) "*special contextual reasons*!"²⁶ I will argue further in my "*Sharpest Rule*" that the "signification of the nouns" used is even more evident in *Histories* 4.71 than are any "special contextual reasons," and that such signification is as good as if not a better reason to separate the nouns and apply them to different individuals.

- 3) **Ordinals**: Numbers which are part of a series of numbers. For example, *1, 2, 3, 4, 5* are ordinals.

Example: Strabo (64 BC to 24 CE), *Geography* 17.1.11.

ὁ τέταρτος καὶ ἕβδομος

("the fourth and seventh" [applied to different persons]).

In his explanation for this exception to Sharp's rule, Wallace writes:

This is a clear violation of Sharp's canon—and one which does not fit the other categories of exceptions which we have discovered thus far. For this reason it is a rather noteworthy text. It is interesting that Strabo adds "and the last" (καὶ ὁ ὕστατος) with the article. One might conjecture that in a list of this sort, where "the fourth" cannot possibly refer to the same person as "the seventh," the article could easily be omitted, while since "the seventh" and "the last" could, in a given context, refer to the same person, the article is necessarily reinserted. (It could even happen in *this* context from a reader's perspective, for unless one is consciously counting the rulers, some confusion is most likely.)²⁷

Again, Wallace has left Sharp's rule in order to explain a clear exception to it and Wallace has instead sought out reasons for the exception based on the use or non-use of the article "in a list of this sort," not simply relative to a "Sharp's rule" text, or "in a given context," such as this one, where Wallace believes that, *in spite of* the fact that we have a "Sharp's rule" text which is supposed to eliminate the confusion in the identity of the referent(s) when it is used, Wallace concludes that "some confusion is most likely"!

Now consider this example again in its fuller context according to the English translation of Hamilton and Falconer, to which I have added all bracketed numbers, text, and underlining, but not the parenthetical comments which are original to the following translation of *Geography* 17.1.11:

²⁵ Ἐπαφρόδιτον τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ συνεργὸν καὶ συστρατιώτην μου ("Ephroditus, my brother, fellow-worker, and fellow-soldier").

²⁶ Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," pages 128-129; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 127-128. See my note 23 on pages 8-9 for Wallace's further revision to Sharp's rule in light of his view of "enumeration," as well for my counter-revision which puts enumeration in its proper light of "two or more" substantives, rather than Wallace's preferred "three or more nouns" (see note 16).

²⁷ Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," page 131; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 129-130.

Alexander was succeeded by [1]Ptolemy the son of Lagus, the son of Lagus by [2]Philadelphus, Philadelphus by [3]Euergetes; next succeeded [4]Philopator the lover of Agathocleia, then [5]Epiphanes, afterwards [6]Philometor, the son (thus far) always succeeding the father. But Philometor was succeeded by his brother, [7]the second Euergetes, who was also called Physcon. He was succeeded by [8]Ptolemy surnamed Lathurus, Lathurus by [9]Auletes of our time, who was the father of Cleopatra. All these kings, after the third Ptolemy, were corrupted by luxury and effeminacy, and the affairs of government were very badly administered by them; but worst of all by the fourth, the seventh [ὁ τέταρτος καὶ ἕβδομος] and the last [καὶ ὁ ὕστατος] (Ptolemy), Auletes (or the Piper).²⁸

It is unclear why Wallace creates confusion over the number of kings listed here by Strabo, which as I have marked above amounts to “9.” Therefore, it is *not* likely that any reader of Strabo would confuse “the seventh” with “the last,” since “the seventh” is plainly identified as “the second Euergetes” and further as “Physcon,” while “the last” (the “9th”) is also named, “Auletes”! The context and the use of any terms or other markers of identity, not simply the syntax as defined by “Sharp’s rule,” tell us ‘who is who.’

- 4) **Translation Greek:** For example, Greek used to translate Hebrew, as we have in most of the books of the Septuagint.

Example: Proverbs 24:21 (LXX).

φοβοῦ τὸν θεόν υἱέ καὶ βασιλέα
 (“My son, fear God and the king”).

That Proverbs 24:21 is not referring to one person in the above text with the two titles “God” and “king” is clear in this case from the plural reference in the same verse (“and do not disobey either of *them* [αὐτῶν]”), and also likely from the “signification of the nouns” used. But in terms of “Sharp’s rule,” Proverbs 24:21 is a clear exception.

Indeed, in spite of the fact that the context and the use of the plural pronoun (“them”) makes it clear two persons are in view, the translator(s) chose to use a “Sharp’s rule” construction to indicate more than one individual referent! Wallace initially offered the following three admittedly “speculative” explanations for the anarthrous βασιλέα in this text²⁹:

- 1) The translator, using formal fidelity and dynamic equivalence in his translation, may have been distracted by ׀ִנִּי (“my son”), resulting in an unintentional violation of Greek grammar;
- 2) The translator may have deliberately chosen the anarthrous βασιλέα, believing ‘the location of the syntactically unrelated υἱέ disrupted the semantics of Sharp’s rule.’
- 3) The “syntax of poetry is known to deviate from that of prose in many and substantial ways ... the article is frequently dispensed with for metrical convenience.”

²⁸ H.C. Hamilton and W. Falconer, *The Geography of Strabo, Literally Translated, with Notes*, 3 vols. (London: George Bell & Sons, 1903). Link: <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3atext%3a1999.01.0239> (last accessed January 17, 2011).

²⁹ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 125-127; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 124-127.

Though accepting Proverbs 24:21(LXX) “as an exception to Sharp’s rule,” Wallace feels “it is almost exclusively tied to the LXX as translation Greek.”³⁰ However, the fact that this is a *translation* into Greek makes the exception all the more significant, that is, in view of the likely reflection by the translator(s) on which syntax would be *best* to use in this instance. Further, and similar to what I wrote in my Second Edition’s Excursus on Sharp’s rule in direct response to all three of Wallace’s above explanations:

- 1) Wallace assumes too much for the LXX translator(s) here in trying to come up with an explanation for this exception to “Sharp’s rule,” citing the translator’s possible ‘distraction’ by one term resulting in “an unintentional violation of Greek grammar,” for which Wallace cites no evidence.
- 2) Wallace claims the reason for this exception may be because the translator(s) “deliberately” used this syntax believing “the location of the syntactically unrelated οἶέ disrupted the semantics of Sharp’s rule,” even though it is a vocative and *not* an accusative case noun! That the choice of the anarthrous noun “king” was “deliberate” no one can dispute, because *that is what is in the text*. Therefore, the burden is on Wallace to show that the translator(s) may have been “deliberate” in using a Sharp’s rule construction in this text to indicate *two* persons because “the location of the syntactically unrelated οἶέ disrupted the semantics of Sharp’s rule.” Further, the location of the vocative “my son” is not unusual at all in 24:21, that is, after one considers its placement at the start of and after the start of sentences throughout Proverbs LXX. Compare the location of οἶέ in Proverbs 1:8, 10; 4:10, 20; 5:1, 7; 6:1, 3; 7:1, 24; 23:15, 19, 22, 26; 24:1, 13; 27:11, 27; 30:1; 31:2. Though none of these texts have οἶέ in a Sharp’s rule construction, they show clearly that οἶέ may come first or later in a sentence without any ‘disruption of the semantics’ to nouns in other grammatical cases, though that is what Wallace claims may have occurred in 24:21, in spite of the fact that Wallace otherwise believes the syntax used is supposed to make clear the application of the involved nouns.
- 3) Wallace acknowledges that verbs, adjectives and pronouns occasionally interfere with article-noun-καί-noun constructions, but that in any event “the καί in Prov 24:21 still connects the two accusatives syntactically, in spite of the presence of the vocative.”³¹

Indeed, “and” does connect the “two accusatives syntactically,” and there is no reason for anyone to get “distracted” by the presence of a vocative. Yet, Wallace clearly is distracted by it because he cannot use Sharp’s rule to interpret this text in spite of the fact that it fits all of the requirements of “Sharp’s rule.” The fact that Greek was used to translate the Hebrew text of Proverbs 24:21 is not the issue (though Wallace has made it the issue, in large part), because of the fact that the Proverbs Greek translator(s) “deliberately” chose to use a “Sharp’s rule” construction to indicate *two* persons, without any apparent concern for any potential ambiguity resulting from the translation or from the placement of οἶέ.

Further, several church writers quote Proverbs 24:21 *verbatim* from the LXX or from another Greek version, or possibly translate the text in such a way so that it appears to be an even

³⁰ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 127; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 127.

³¹ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 126, notes 116, 117; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 125, notes 71 and 72. Note, however, Wallace’s hedging from his 1995 dissertation to his 2009 publication, both of which are identical except for the underlined part:

Wallace (1995): “the καί in Prov 24:21 still connects the two accusatives syntactically ...”

Wallace, (2009): “the καί in Prov 24:21 still seems to connect the two accusatives syntactically ...”

more clear instance of Sharp's first rule, though still indicating two persons. Indeed, Wallace references John Chrysostom (c. 350—407) and John of Damascus (c. 675—749) as he attempts to group these references along with Proverbs 24:21(LXX) as “translation Greek.”³² But neither John Chrysostom nor John of Damascus appear to have *translated* the text they quoted (though that is possible), as nothing else in their writings indicates here that they were translating another language into Greek. Therefore, it seems to be wishful thinking on Wallace's part to so describe these texts or to try to lump them together with Proverbs 24:21 as “translation Greek,” though doing so in my view makes the exceptions *stronger* or more clear, not “weaker” or less relevant to the discussion, since translating requires a conscious, deliberate choice of which words and which syntax to use.

Also, in his 1995 dissertation and in his 2009 *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin* for some reason Wallace does not cite the use of Proverbs 24:21 in Ignatius' longer version of his epistle to the Smyrnaeans (Chapter 9), which makes even clearer the application of “king” to the one ruling at that time, to the one whom “none of the rulers should be compared.”³³ This makes the “king” here specific, even as “God,” “Christ,” and “bishop” are also specific references to single, significant and so also *known* persons.³⁴ When “kings” in general are meant the plural form is used just as it is used later in this text from the longer version of Smyrnaeans 9.³⁵

Wallace's omission of this text is significant for at least three reasons: 1) The citation of Proverbs 24:21 in the longer version of Ignatius' Smyrnaeans 9 contains a *rewording* of the text so that it is an even more clearly identifiable instance of a “Sharp's rule” construction, but which still *breaks* Sharp's first rule³⁶; 2) *I cited this text for Wallace* in both my 1998 and 2000 Excursuses on this subject;³⁷ and 3) *Winstanley cited it for Sharp* (and so also for Wallace, who clearly did read Winstanley's *Vindication*).³⁸

³² I have checked the citations in Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 127, note 121; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 127, note 78.

³³ οὔτε βασιλέως τις παραπλήσιος ἐν ἄρχομενοῖς (from William Cureton's *Corpus Ignatium: A Complete Collection of the Ignatian Epistles* [London: Francis & John Rivington, 1849], page 111).

³⁴ Where it concerns the inclusion of “bishop” in this series of figures, consider the shorter version of Ignatius' declaration that “the one who does anything without the bishop's knowledge serves the devil” (ὁ λάθρα ἐπισκόπου τι πράσων τῷ διαβόλῳ λατρεύει [translation and text in J. B. Lightfoot and J. R. Harmer, *The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations of Their Writings*, Second Edition, edited and revised by Michael W. Holmes (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), pages 190-191]).

³⁵ Εἰ γὰρ ὁ βασιλεῦσιν ἐπεγειρόμενος (“if the one rising up against kings” [Greek text from Cureton, *Corpus Ignatium*, page 111]).

³⁶ Note the intentional relocation (if a quotation) of the vocative υἱέ to *before* τὸν θεόν, though no other change was made to the article-noun-καὶ-noun construction: φησὶν, υἱέ, τὸν θεὸν καὶ βασιλέα (Migne 853.10).

³⁷ *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended*, First Edition, page 224, note 15; Second Edition, pages 372-373 (available online: http://www.elihubooks.com/data/topical_index/000/000/309/JWD2_Excursus_Sharp's_Rule_2000.pdf).

³⁸ After quoting Proverbs 24:21 in the LXX, Winstanley writes to Sharp as follows (with my underlining):

This passage from the Septuagint, which I am surprised you should have overlooked, is thus quoted, in the interpolated epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans [*sic*]: φησιν, υἱε, τον θεον και βασιλεα [as presented by Winstanley in his *Vindication*, page 11].

In his 2009 publication Wallace adds a fourth possible explanation for Proverbs 24:21 LXX's breaking of Sharp's rule, which reason Wallace did not include in his 1995 dissertation, namely, that "king" may be used generically rather than specifically for one individual (see the discussion of generic nouns on pages 6-7). According to Wallace (with my underlining): "A fourth possibility is simply that βασιλέα ['king'] here is to be taken generically. That is, 'Fear God and whoever the king happens to be.'"³⁹

Wallace points out that "king" is used in Proverbs thirty-five times, but in his view only twice for "a specific king." Though Wallace does not list out all of his references, one of the two *specific* (non-generic) "king" references which Wallace accepts for this book comes in Proverbs 25:1, shortly after 24:21. Wallace's other reference to a specific "king" in Proverbs is in 31:1. However, Wallace fails to note ἐκ προσώπου βασιλέως in 25:5, which could hardly mean "you must slay evil (ones)" (κτείνε ἀσεβεῖς) from before the "face" of "*whoever the king happens to be*"! What if the king is evil? I do not then see how the proverb would apply as it appears to have been intended. Finally, there may also be a specific reference to the then ruling (and so *known*) "king" in 25:6, for there "king" is contrasted with the generic plural for "rulers" (δυναστῶν).

Further, in 24:21 (LXX) the verse concludes with, "and do not disobey *either one of them*" (καὶ μητέρω αὐτῶν ἀπειθήσης). The LXX here uses a form of μητέτερος (also μηδέτερος⁴⁰). Used only here in Proverbs 24:21 in the entire LXX, and nowhere in the NT, this adjective clearly describes those who should *not* be disobeyed, namely, "neither of the two."⁴¹ In this case, the reader is not to "disobey" either the specific "God" or "king" who *is* ruling, not 'whoever he happens to be.'

Proverbs 24:21(LXX) and its citation *verbatim* and otherwise in the writings of the early church fathers Ignatius, John Chrysostom, and John of Damascus are all further exceptions to Sharp's rule involving personal 'nouns of signification' ("God" and "king") applied to *two* different persons, though only the first of the two personal nouns has the article.

4) **New Testament Greek:** Greek as used in the various writings of the New Testament.

Examples: Ephesians 5:5.

τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ
("the kingdom of Christ and God").

2 Thessalonians 1:12.

τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ
("of our God and Lord Jesus Christ").

1 Timothy 5:21.

τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἀγγέλων
("of God and Christ Jesus and the chosen angels").

³⁹ Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 126.

⁴⁰ Edwin Hatch and Henry A. Redpath, *A Concordance to the Septuagint*, Second Edition (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), page 921, who note the form μηδέτερος is used by Aquila in his version of Proverbs 24:21.

⁴¹ H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, revised by H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976 [1968]), page 1125.

Though Sharp believed all of the above NT texts fit his first rule (and so in all of them Sharp believed Jesus to be called “God”),⁴² Wallace does not. His reasons for rejecting the above texts as instances of Sharp’s rule are: 1) In texts such as 1 Timothy 5:21 “‘Christ Jesus’ is surely a proper name”; 2) Wallace believes “one would be hard-pressed to view this [‘Christ’ in Ephesians 5:5] as less than a proper name”⁴³; and 3) “Second Thessalonians 1:12 does not have merely ‘Lord’ in the equation, but ‘Lord Jesus Christ,’” and so Wallace believes that “only by detaching [‘Lord’] from [‘Jesus Christ’] could one apply Sharp’s rule to this construction.”⁴⁴

⁴² See Sharp, *Remarks*, pages 28-29, 32-37. There are other texts which Sharp fit into his discussion of christologically significant texts, including what have become perhaps the two most significant of them all in terms of the application of Sharp’s rule in the NT (namely, Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1), but which I have discussed at length previously (see *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended*, First Edition, pages 238-246; and, especially, my Second Edition, pages 388-405). I will do so again in my forthcoming *The “Sharpest Rule.”*

⁴³ Compare, however, Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 247, note 202, and Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 237, note 7, which shows that to this day Wallace is unable to make a decision on this text, “exact parallels to Eph 5:5 are not easily forthcoming ... We must, therefore, in this thesis [‘this volume’ (2009)] remain undecided.”

⁴⁴ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 246-247; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 236-237. In his note to this comment (page 246, note 200 in “Multiple Substantives”; page 236, note 5 in *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*) Wallace writes, “So Sharp, *Remarks*, 34-35.” But Sharp, after first claiming on his page 32 that “if two distinct persons had really been intended to be expressed ... the article would have been repeated ... after the copulative and before the second substantive” (which is not true; see Matthew 22:32 [compare Luke 20:37; John 13:13; 2 John 7; Revelation 1:5; see also page 26, note 68), notes on pages 33-34 of his *Remarks* that in the “Alexandrian MS.” the text is “awkwardly divided” by a point which by adding to the text after the word for “our” the “intention of the transcriber ... has been probably to make a distinction of persons” (underlining added)! Sharp then attempts to discredit the Alexandrian manuscript’s apparent use of punctuation because of what he calls “the ignorance and fallacy of the interpolator.” Further, Sharp does not fully or fairly consider the proper character or usage of the nouns or the full significance of the definite reference indicated by *the name* “Jesus” included in the second part of 2 Thessalonians 1:12 and in other, similar texts. The need for this was repeatedly pointed out to Sharp and to Middleton by Blunt (see, for example, my quotation of Blunt in part on this point on page 5, note 12), by Winstanley (see, for examples, *Vindication*, pages 23-24, 27-28, 30, and especially the Appendix to Winstanley’s American Edition, pages 45-55), and in *The Monthly Review* (June, 1810), page 152, the last of which reads concerning the application of Sharp’s rule by Middleton (all bracketed comments are mine and underlining has been added):

[T]hough ‘commonly subject to Mr. Sharp’s rule [referring to Middleton’s comments],’ [“Lord”] is not subject to it in some of the texts which he has adduced (such as 2Thess. i. 12. 1Tim 5. 21. and 2Tim iv. 1.) on account of its being [or containing] a proper name, or part of a proper name, and yet *may*, even when standing close to the proper name [“Jesus Christ”], be so ‘disjoined and detached from it’ as to make no approach towards a proper name, but, on the contrary, be so perfectly appellative as to ‘be identified with a preceding attributive.’ ... Now as Mr. Sharp, by one of his limitations, has excluded proper names from his rule, Dr. Middleton, by his remarks concerning [“Christ”], [“Lord”], and [“God”], and their approaches towards proper names, has rendered it very doubtful whether there be, if he has not made it clear that there is not, any word left in the New Testament to which Mr. Sharp can apply his rule, so as to make it support the theological tenet of our Saviour’s divinity, except the word [“Savior”]. Yet even that word ... would, we think, have reason to complain of being unfairly treated, if it were to be deprived of the privilege of approaching a proper name, or even of being incorporated with it, and of having a license, in virtue of such approach, or incorporation, to take or reject the article indifferently, as well as its brethren.

Compare Sharp’s response to some of the objections to certain texts involving proper names or nouns used similarly in his *A Dissertation on the Supreme Divine Dignity of the Messiah: in reply to a Tract, entitled, “A Vindication of Certain Passages in the Common English Version of the New Testament”* (London: B. Edwards, 1806), pages 38-52. Note, however, that Winstanley’s 1819 American Edition Appendix was published later, including a further discussion of the use of proper or *quasi* proper and compound names, primarily in response to Middleton. All of these works will be discussed further in my pending work on this subject.

The new exception to Sharp's rule which I will introduce at the end of this paper contradicts Wallace's above claim concerning the application of Sharp's rule to a text with "Lord" in the second position, where it is absent (or 'detached from') "Jesus Christ," but where it still does not conform to *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*.

It must be noted here that the above listed and other, similar NT other texts which include 1) *a proper name* ("Jesus"), 2) a noun which has become the same as or similar to a proper name by its application to specific or known individuals ("*quasi*-proper names," such as "God," "Lord," "Christ," and "Savior"), or 3) which contain *both* a proper name and a noun of personal description used together as a compound proper name ("Lord Jesus Christ," "Christ Jesus," and even "Savior Jesus Christ") are the most comparable examples to texts such as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1.

Indeed, consider the second part of these last two texts together with the second part of the construction used in 2 Thessalonians 1:12:

2 Thessalonians 1:12: ... καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

Titus 2:13: ... καὶ σωτήρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

2 Peter 1:1: ... καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

Notice that, aside from the possessive pronoun in Titus 2:13, the constructions are the same except that in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 we have "Lord Jesus Christ" and in the two disputed texts we have "Savior Jesus Christ." According to Wallace, while in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 "Lord Jesus Christ" is a compound proper name and therefore outside the pale of Sharp's principle,⁴⁵ in Titus 2:13 and in 2 Peter 1:1 the use of "Savior" and "Savior Jesus Christ" are considered differently, that is (by Wallace and by others, though not by all), *not* as proper or as *quasi* proper names or as a compound proper name. This is because, according to Murray J. Harris (quoted with approval by Wallace):

Only if it could be established that σωτήρ (ἡμῶν) Ἰησοῦς Χριστός was an early credal formula comparable to κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός could one argue that σωτήρ was anarthrous in Titus 2:13 [or in 2 Peter 1:1] because of its widespread technical use.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," page 250, note 211. Compare Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 243, note 21, in which the matter is put more carefully ("Lord Jesus Christ" is almost always a compound proper name"), though Wallace reaches the same conclusion ("and therefore outside the pale of Sharp's principle"). Before Wallace, Middleton had already acknowledged, "Κύριος Ἰ. Χρ. is a common title of Christ, and is often used independently of all that precedes it," and so its occurrence in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 "affords no certain evidence in favor of Mr. Sharp" (*The Doctrine of the Greek Article*, pages 381, 382). Further, as I noted in my Second Edition's Excursus on this subject (page 387), in "The Use of the Articular and Anarthrous Κύριος in the Pauline Corpus" (M.A. thesis, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1989), pages 31-33, Carl J. Davis lists the occurrences of compound names for Jesus with κύριος, concluding that "when κύριος is joined to θεός by καί, κύριος generally lacks the definite article" (underlining added). Combine this with Abbot's important but rather obvious observation, "the simple addition of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ to κυρίου makes the reference to the two distinct subjects clear without the insertion of the article" (Abbot, "On the Construction of Titus ii. 13," page 15).

⁴⁶ Cited in Wallace, "Multiple Substantives," page 263, note 247; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 254, note 58, a view to which Wallace says "nothing more needs to be said"! See also Harris, *Jesus as God: The New Testament Use of Theos in Reference to Jesus* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), page 181. On page 182 of *Jesus as God* Harris accurately represents a view contrary to his own, which holds that the "prefixing of the appositional

And, yet, to quote Werner Foerster (with my underlining):

In 2 Peter σωτήρ is used only of Jesus and it is relatively common, 1:1, 11; 2:20; 3:2, 18. The contexts, however, provide no clear basis for its choice. The three titles of Jesus, θεός, κύριος, and σωτήρ alternate for no obvious reason, as may be seen from the expression ἐν ἐπιγνώσει: ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Ἰησοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν (1:2); ἐν ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (2:20); ἐν ... γνώσει τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (3:18); cf. also ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:1). It would seem that σωτήρ was a common title for Christ in the days of 2 Pt. An unmistakable liking for solemn and resounding statements contributed to the frequent use of σωτήρ predication in this letter.⁴⁷

I have underlined the introductory formulas along with each occurrence of “and Jesus” and “and Savior” cited by Foerster in making his point that “the three titles of Jesus, θεός, κύριος, and σωτήρ alternate for no obvious reason,” and “that σωτήρ was a title for Christ in the days of 2 Pt.,” *as is evidenced by* “the frequent use of σωτήρ predication in this letter”!

However, though Alford claims “there is no doubt that σωτήρ [‘Savior,’ by itself] was one of those words which gradually dropped the article and became a *quasi proper name*,”⁴⁸ it is not necessary in the case of either Titus 2:13 or 2 Peter 1:1 to view σωτήρ (“Savior”) alone as a proper name, or even as its equivalent, though its use in the NT strongly suggests it was known and used as such, particularly in 2 Peter, similar to the use of “Lord” and the use of “Christ.”⁴⁹ Indeed, Abbot, though expressly stating he finds “no sufficient proof of [Alford’s]

substantive σωτήρος to the proper name of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ has led to the anarthrous state of σωτήρος.” Harris responds to this view by writing on his page 182 (though all bracketed comments are mine):

It is not clear, however, that an appositional noun [such as “Savior”] that precedes proper name [such as “Jesus Christ”] is necessarily anarthrous [though it often is, including in both Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1!]. Second Timothy 1:10 has διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ, while in four other passages in the Pastorals σωτήρ ἡμῶν is articular preceding the anarthrous quasi-proper name θεός.

As I wrote in my Second Edition’s Excursus on this subject (page 399), “none of the examples Harris gives are parallel to Titus 2:13 [or to 2 Peter 1:1]” in their use of “Savior Jesus Christ” because none of them have “Savior Jesus Christ” *following* καί! The possible significance of such terms when standing apart from or when immediately following καί is clear from the use of similar terms (such as “Lord” [see note 45]) and from the use of “Savior” in the very examples Harris gives. Indeed, all five of his Pastoral examples (1 Timothy 2:3; Titus 1:3; 2:10; 3:4; 2 Timothy 1:10) have the article before “Savior.” Yet, when you consider the NT use of “Savior” when it immediately follows καί (Acts 5:31; Philippians 3:20; Titus 2:13; 2 Peter 1:1, 11; 2:20; 3:2, 18), *it is always anarthrous*. This is true also in the LXX (see Esther 5:1; Psalm 26:1; 61:3, 7; Isaiah 45:21). Finally, it should be noted that none of Harris’ examples use “Savior” with “Jesus Christ,” though this usage does occur with “Savior” articulated *apart from* a καί-joined expression in Titus 3:6 (διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν).

⁴⁷ Werner Foerster, “σωτήρ,” in the *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed., Gerhard Friedrich, vol. 7 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978 [1971]), page 1018.

⁴⁸ Henry Alford, *The Greek Testament*, vol. 3, rev. Everett F. Harrison (Chicago: Moody, 1958), page 420 (emphasis added).

⁴⁹ See my discussion of Ephesians 5:5 and its use of “Christ” as a proper name or as a fixed designation for Jesus in my Excursus on Sharp’s rule in *Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended*, Second Edition, pages 384–386. See also Robert W. Funk, “The Syntax of the Greek Article: Its Importance for Critical Pauline Problems” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1953), page 192, who writes that “the messianic designation [Χριστός] comes to be a personal name” even though Paul often uses it without the article. In Ephesians when Χριστός is used by itself (for

statement that σωτήρ had become in the N. T. ‘a quasi proper name,’” still goes on to make one of the key points involving *the actual proper name* (!) that is used in these texts (with my underlining):

[T]he addition of Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ to σωτήρος ἡμῶν changes the case entirely, restricting the σωτήρος ἡμῶν to a person or being who, according to Paul's habitual use of language, is distinguished from the person or being whom he designates as ὁ θεός, so that there was no need of the repetition of the article to prevent ambiguity.⁵⁰

example, apart from the name Ἰησοῦς) it is without the article seven times (1:3; 2:12; 4:15, 32; 5:21, 32; 6:6) and twenty times it has the article (1:9, 12, 20; 2:5, 13; 3:4, 8, 17, 19; 4:7, 12, 13, 20; 5:2, 14, 23, 24, 25, 29; 6:5). When used together with Ἰησοῦς it is without the article thirteen times (1:1 [twice], 2, 5; 2:6, 7, 10, 13; 3:6, 21; 5:20; 6:23, 24) and only twice does it take the article (3:1 [supported by P⁴⁶ Ⲛ² A B (C) D² Ψ], 11). Therefore, it is not surprising to find that Χριστός, used apart from the name Ἰησοῦς, is preceded by the article in Ephesians 5:5, but separate from “God” which follows it, consistent also with Paul's practice elsewhere in Ephesians (1:1, 2, 3, 17; 2:4-5, 10, 19-20; 3:10-11; 4:32; 5:2, 20; 6:23) of presenting but of also at the same time differentiating “God” from “Christ.”

⁵⁰ Abbot, “On the Construction of Titus ii. 13,” page 14. For more on “Paul's habitual use of language,” see my figure “E.1” on pages 390-392 of my Second Edition of *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended*, which shows and discusses the “*Use of θεός in the Pauline Corpus.*” In relation to Abbot's comments about Paul's “habitual use of language,” I will here also note that the “considerations derived from Paul's system of doctrine” mentioned by G. B. Winer (*A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek*, trans. W. F. Moulton [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1882], page 162), have been unfairly represented by Wallace, as if “G. B. Winer ... allowed his theological bias to override the plain evidence from the syntax governed by Sharp's Rule” (Wallace, “The Semantic Range,” page 64). Wallace goes even further in his 1995 and 2009 treatments of Sharp's rule, writing (with my underlining added):

George Benedict Winer, the great NT grammarian of the nineteenth century, in this instance spoke outside of his realm, for he gave an unsubstantiated opinion based on a theological preunderstanding. Yet this single footnote largely brought about the eclipse of understanding of Sharp's rule. Friend and foe alike have unwittingly abused the canon, with the result that scores of NT passages have been misunderstood. [Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 280; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 282; compare Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 66-67; Wallace, “Granville Sharp: A Model of Evangelical Scholarship and Social Activism,” pages 608-609, 611 Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 69-70.]

Here is Winer's “single footnote,” in relevant part (with my underlining):

For reasons which lie in the doctrinal system of Paul, I do not regard σωτήρος [“Savior”] as a second predicate by the side of θεοῦ [“God”], as if Christ were first styled ὁ μέγας θεός [“the great God”] and then σωτήρ [“Savior”]. ... [then to footnote 2: ...] the dogmatic conviction derived from Paul's writings that this apostle cannot have called Christ the great God induced me to show that there is no grammatical obstacle to our taking the clause [καὶ σωτήρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ] by itself, as referring to a second subject. [Winer, *A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek*, page 162, and from note 2 on the same page.]

Wallace writes that Winer's concerns over what he considered Paul's ‘doctrine’ or belief about calling Christ, not simply “G-god,” but “*the great God*,” amount to “unsubstantiated opinion based on a theological preunderstanding.” Yet, not only did Winer (and Moulton, in his translation of Winer here) provide significant grammatical evaluations of Sharp's rule texts (see Winer's *A Treatise on the Grammar of New Testament Greek*, pages 162-163, which I will discuss further in my pending “*Sharpest Rule*”), but as I have shown also in my Second Edition (see pages 389-396), and as Ezra Abbot showed also before me (see Abbot, “On the Construction of Titus ii. 13,” page 19), Winer was right to essentially note the restricted nature of the description, “the great God” (τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ) in Titus 2:13 as belonging to the Father because of its fixed use for him in the OT and elsewhere (see, for examples, the LXX of Deuteronomy 7:21 [θεὸς μέγας καὶ κραταίος, “(is) a great and powerful God”]; 10:17 [ὁ θεὸς ὁ μέγας καὶ ἰσχυρὸς καὶ ὁ φοβερὸς; Rahlfs' edition of the LXX; but A [and the Göttingen] show the article before all three adjectives [see my note on this text in my Second Edition's Excursus on Sharp's rule, page 389, note 76]; Nehemiah 8:6 [τὸν θεὸν τὸν μέγαν, “the great God”]; Psalm 77[76]:13[14] [τίς θεὸς μέγας ὡς ὁ θεός, “who is a great God as is our God?”]; 85:10 [ὅτι μέγας εἶ σὺ ... σὺ εἶ ὁ θεός μόνος ὁ μέγας, “For you are great ... you alone are the great God”]; see also Ezra 5:8 [2 Ezra in Rahlfs]; Nehemiah 4:14; Psalm 95[94]:3; Isaiah 26:5; Jeremiah 39[32]:19; Daniel 2:45 and 9:4 [compare the two readings in Rahlfs]). This fixed description is also found in the Dead Sea Scrolls, even distinguishing “the great God” from his “Son”! In the famous, Aramaic “Son of God” text

(4Q246), which is strikingly similar to Luke 1:32-35, we read of the “Son of the Most High” in column 2, line 1, and about how his “kingdom will be an everlasting kingdom” in column 2, line 5. Then in line 7, column 2, it says “the great God [אל רבא] will be his patron” (see John J. Collins, “A Pre-Christian ‘Son of God’ Among the Dead Sea Scrolls,” *BR* 9.3 [June 1993], page 37, underlining added). Related to the fixed nature of this description, as noted in G.A. Cooke, *A Text-Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), page 250, there are also inscriptions and coins where the two terms used for “the great God” (אל רבא) are combined to form the proper name רבאל (“Rabel”), which was used for the last Nabataean king. The distinction between “the great God” and his “Son” was also carried over into later Christian tradition, as can be seen from the use of “the great God” in the Sibylline Oracles (see my Second Edition Excursus, page 395, note 102). Two of these references (1.324 and 3.776) are considered later Christian interpolations which refer to “the son of the great God,” which is very similar to the language used in 4Q246! See also the OT Apocrypha in 3 Maccabees 7:2, which uses τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ and where the superlative of μέγας (μέγιστος, “greatest”) modifies “God” in several other texts (for example, 2 Maccabees 3:36; 3 Maccabees 1:9, 16; 3:11; 4:16; 5:25; 7:22 [Codex A reads *megalou*]). This is similar to what we find in Josephus, who regularly refers to the God of the OT as ὁ μέγιστος θεός (see *A Complete Concordance to Flavius Josephus*, Karl H. Rengstorff, ed., vol. 3 [Leiden: Brill, 1979], pages 63-70). Examples include *Antiquities of the Jews* 6.86; 7.353; 8.319 (*megalou* is a variant reading for *megistou* here); 9.133, 288-289; 11.3, 90. In Philo’s work *On the Special Law Books* (4.177) he quotes Deuteronomy 10:17-18, where ὁ θεὸς ὁ μέγας (“the great God”) is used (see also *On the Cherubim* [30.1] where Philo refers to τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ φιλοδώρου θεοῦ [“the great and bountiful God”] and *On Dreams* [1.94], τοῦ πάντα μεγάλου θεοῦ [“the infinitely great God” (LCL translation)]). There is good evidence, therefore, to show that before, during, and after the first century CE “the great God” was a fixed expression for God the Father, but which has been largely ignored by Wallace (compare his very weak response to a similar point to Fee, in Wallace’s *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 263, note 88). Yet, this is exactly what Winer was concerned about: If “the great God” refers to the Father then it cannot also apply to “Savior Jesus Christ,” that is, according to Paul’s regular ‘doctrine’ which consistently separates the Father from “Jesus” (this is true even in Trinitarianism), since “Jesus” is not the “Father” and Jesus is not regularly or even ever clearly ever called “the great God.” Instead of addressing my full range of arguments supporting Winer’s hesitation in this matter, in his 2009 publication’s note 59, page 254, Wallace first expressly cites the 2000 Excursus from my Second Edition of *Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended*, but Wallace then refers to J. Ed Komoszewski’s earlier 1999 reply to my 1998 First Edition’s Excursus (which is not cited by Wallace), to which I responded *before* my 2000 Excursus was ever published! This gives the impression that Komoszewski’s article is inclusive of a response to my 2000 Second Edition when it could not possibly have been as it was written before 2000, in 1999, in response to my 1998, First Edition. The link to Komoszewski’s article is also cited in Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 254, note 59, which according to his note 59 Wallace “last accessed” on November 24, 2006 (and which I last checked on July 23, 2010 [and which I also checked again upon revision of this article on January 18, 2011]). However, my response to Komoszewski’s 1999 article, with a link to his article (though neither Komoszewski nor Wallace link or reference my earlier, online response to Komoszewski) has been listed on “Jehovah’s Witnesses United” web site (http://www.jehovah.to/exe/discussion/nwt_asks.htm [last accessed on January 18, 2011]) for over 10 years! Further, in their book *Putting Jesus in His Place: The Case for the Deity of Christ* (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 2007), Komoszewski and Robert M. Bowman, Jr., refer, not to Komoszewski’s 1999 online article, but to Bowman’s, “Sharp’s Rules and Antitrinitarian Theologies: A Defense of Granville Sharp’s Argument for the Deity of Christ” article (no date given). Yet, now as of January 18, 2011, the link cited on page 333, in note 46 (http://www.biblicalapologetics.net/NTStudies/Sharps_Rule.pdf) of *Putting Jesus in His Place* does not produce an active document or web page for anything related to “Biblical Apologetics,” let alone Sharp’s rule. Indeed, the home site “www.biblicalapologetics.net” does not come up at all (last checked on January 18, 2011). The only copies of Bowman’s article which I received from him or which I have since found online are dated May 25, 1998, and “Revised,” August 19, 1998 (labeled as “A Bicentennial Defense,” which description is left out of Bowman’s and Komoszewski’s reference). However, as with Komoszewski’s article (cited by Wallace) *both* of Bowman’s “Sharp’s Rules and Antitrinitarian Theologies” predate my 2000 Excursus, and my 2000 Second Edition Excursus includes material from my online discussions with Bowman concerning his 1998 “Bicentennial” article (see the “Discussion Logs Index” located at: <http://www.jehovah.to/exe/discussion/index.htm> [last accessed January 18, 2011]). I will discuss all of this further, along with Wallace’s mistreatment of Winer, Moulton, Simcox, the testimony of “Mr. Gregory Blunt,” Calvin Winstanley, Ezra Abbot, and others in my pending “*The Sharpest Rule*.” I will close this note by pointing out that what first helped the ‘eclipse’ of “understanding” of Sharp’s rule was first Sharp himself (see my discussion on pages 4-5) and then after him many Trinitarians and some non-Trinitarians who were not carefully considering the issues and the responses already given by Winstanley, by Abbot, by Alford, and by others, and most recently by me in my 1995 letter to Wallace (cited in the Appendix) and in my 1998 and 2000 Excursuses

There is at least one other NT exception to *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin* to cite here, one which is nowhere discussed by Sharp, by Middleton, or by Wallace:

1 Timothy 6:13.

τοῦ θεοῦ ... καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ
 (“of God ... and Christ Jesus”).

Where I have used ellipsis (...) the above text has τοῦ ζῳογονοῦντος τὰ πάντα in apposition to τοῦ θεοῦ and τοῦ μαρτυρήσαντος ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου τὴν καλὴν ὁμολογίαν in apposition to Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ. This is another exception to Sharp's rule, and it shows how far apart the NT writer here was prepared to separate the two nouns without any apparent concern for whether readers would make the necessary contextual identifications and associations *in spite of the fact* that a Sharp's first rule construction is used.

In late 1995, after I had read Wallace's 1983 article in *Grace Theological Journal* (cited earlier) while researching “Sharp's rule,” I called Wallace at Dallas Theological Seminary regarding 1 Timothy 6:13 as an exception to Sharp's rule. Wallace answered the phone and after introducing myself I noted the text in question, we reviewed the text together, after which Wallace replied, “Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ is a proper name.” This seemed to me to be a selective viewing of terms as proper names or as their equivalents, given Wallace's view of other texts with similarly significant terms. But it was not the place to pursue the matter further. We discussed a few other, related matters, which I then followed up by letter on December 27, 1995 (see Appendix). I have never received a response to this letter, and while 1 Timothy 6:13 is clearly another exception to Sharp's rule, Wallace did not reference it in his 1995 dissertation, nor in his 1998 *JETS* article, nor in his 2009 publication.⁵¹

In view of the preceding, one might consider 1 Timothy 6:13 “another exception to *Granville Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*,” that is, due in part to Wallace's avoidance of it in his three primary discussions of Sharp's rule published since 1995. But it is not the new exception which is connected with the title of this paper. Before I introduce the ‘other exception’ there are still more exceptions to Sharp's first rule to consider. I will note here, however, at the close of this section involving NT texts, that of the 79 non-variant examples listed by Wallace in his 2009 publication *only 31* appear comparable to me in their use of an indisputable proper name (“Jesus”) in the second position, or in their use of nouns as *quasi* proper names (“Lord,” “Christ”), or in their use of both a proper name and a *quasi* proper

on Sharp's rule, all of which were in large part directly in response to Wallace's treatment of issues related to Sharp's rule. To the discussion I add this paper, and my work to follow.

⁵¹ In fact, 1 Timothy 6:13 was cited and discussed long ago by Winstanley (*Vindication*, pages 26-27). After citing Ephesians 5:5, 1 Timothy 5:21, and 1 Timothy 6:13, *all exceptions to Sharp's first rule*, Winstanley wrote to Sharp:

For what have we before us in the three passages? They are neither more or less than so many similar obtestations [witnesses], from the same author, addressed to the same persons, comprising terms of the same import [Winstanley, *Vindication*, page 27.]

It would, therefore, appear to be impossible for Wallace to have unintentionally missed the occurrence of and the exception to Sharp's first rule in 1 Timothy 6:13. Yet, Wallace cites and discusses this text nowhere in his “Sharp's rule”-related writings that I have seen, not even when presenting Winstanley's arguments and counter-examples to Sharp's rule (see Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 57-61, 112, 122-135, 258-267; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 61-65, 113, 122-133, 249-272).

noun together as compound titles or fixed expressions (such “Christ Jesus,” “Lord Jesus Christ,” and “Savior Jesus Christ”).⁵²

- 5) **Patristic Greek:** Greek as used by Christians who lived and who wrote, in large part about theology and Christian doctrine, near the end of and after the first century CE.

Examples: Martyrdom of Polycarp 22.1.

δόξα τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ καὶ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι
 (“glory to God and the Father and the Holy Spirit”).

Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus 3.12.

τῷ μόνῳ πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ
 (“to the only Father and Son”).⁵³

These examples from early church “fathers” (patristics) refer to “God,” to “the only Father,” to the “Son,” and to the “Holy Spirit,” which is significant since 1) they are both exceptions to Sharp’s rule and 2) the most commonly disputed NT passages (Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1) also use similar terms for some (two) of the same persons. The significance of this point is not lost by Wallace, who gives two explanations for these two exceptions to Sharp’s rule, the first of which is (with my underlining), “It is just possible that by the second century the terms used for the first person of the Trinity became so fixed that the writers regarded them as virtual proper names!”⁵⁴

⁵² The texts which are most comparable to disputed texts (such as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1) include Matthew 12:26; Luke 20:37; John 20:17; Romans 15:6; 1 Corinthians 15:24; 2 Corinthians 1:3 ; 1:21; 11:31; Galatians 1:4; Ephesians 1:3; 5:20; Philippians 4:20; Colossians 1:3; 2:2; 3:17; 1 Thessalonians 1:3; 3:11; 3:13; 1 Timothy 6:13; 6:15; Hebrews 12:2; James 1:27; 3:9; 1 Peter 1:3; 2 Peter 1:11; 2:20; 3:2; 3:18; Jude 4; Revelation 1:6. I will discuss further the significance of Wallace’s NT examples in my pending *The “Sharpest Rule.”* But the differences between these texts and those listed by Wallace in his appendix are obvious, foremost of which is the fact that many of the christologically significant NT texts often *have the proper name “Jesus” included in the expression.* This makes the question of whether the personal noun (“Savior”) is semantically restricted by the proper name with which it is associated rather moot, as it is unlikely that a first-century CE and following reader would have failed to connect the proper name “Jesus” with “Savior” in both Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1.

⁵³ The Greek text for Clement is from Migne (but without his use of capital letters). The Greek and English for the text from the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* is from Kirsopp Lake’s *The Apostolic Fathers*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959 [1913]), page 341.

⁵⁴ And so Wallace essentially ends up coming nearly full circle in his suggestion here from where he tried to leave Middleton, that is, by considering what he earlier had called “the weakest link in the vindication of Sharp’s rule” (Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 65 [compare page 268]; Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 68 [compare page 267]), namely, “no ambiguity could result, for the distinctions in the members of the Trinity were obvious to all,” especially if these terms “became so fixed that the writers regarded them as virtual proper names.” See also C. Kuehne “The Greek Article and the Doctrine of Christ’s Deity,” *Theology* 14 (June, 1974), pages 18-19, who was similarly forced to concede the following regarding the example from the *Martyrdom of Polycarp*:

One would indeed have expected a repetition of the article before ἁγίῳ πνεύματι [“holy spirit”]. Yet its absence here could hardly result in any ambiguity, for the distinction between the first and the third persons of the Trinity was apparently deemed too clear for any confusion to arise.

Exactly! See also Rose’s note 1 in Middleton’s *The Doctrine of the Greek Article* (1841), pages 58-59, where on page 59 Rose writes, “the distinction between the persons of the Trinity was, of course, deemed too clear for any confusion to arise.” What both Rose and Kuehne fail to realize is that this very same line of reasoning is effectively used also to explain other texts which use similar terms. Wallace understands the implications of this argument, which is why I believe he ventures to offer alternative explanations and why, I believe, Wallace is concerned about

As noted earlier, the usage of the NT clearly shows that the term “Savior” was also often a fixed designation for “Jesus” as distinct from the Father. However, returning to the patristic exceptions above Wallace also notes there “are problems with” viewing the terms in these texts as “fixed,” since Wallace would have expected similar phrases (such as, “the God over all” [Romans 9:5] and “Almighty God” [Revelation 16:14]) to likewise have been regarded as equivalents of proper names, and since Wallace believes the same or similar descriptions are occasionally applied equally to both the Father and Son in the writings of the Fathers.⁵⁵

However, what Wallace expects and what we actually find in the text are not always the same things. The fact is, *Martyrdom* 22.1 uses a Sharp’s rule construction with terms which are *not* proper names, but which at times function like proper names, since they often have a fixed reference to known individuals. This is why such nouns do not always need the article when used in a “Sharp’s rule” construction, in or outside of the NT. But when it comes to identifying ‘who is who,’ more than just the syntax of the text in question must be considered. If anything, Sharp’s rule, exceptions to it, and the history of its application to the NT and elsewhere have made this clear!

Still, Wallace considers it a better approach to “recognize that we are assuming too much about [the ‘early church fathers’] own christological articulation ... of the distinctions between members of the Trinity.”⁵⁶ Wallace argues that the patristic exceptions to Sharp’s rule are really just examples of the church fathers ‘overstating their case.’ However, Wallace does not illustrate this where it concerns either the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* or the writings of Clement of Alexandria.

the impact of Winer’s comments regarding Paul’s “doctrinal system,” which is determinable from (not ‘preunderstood’ apart from) Paul’s “habitual use of language” (to quote Abbot). See note 50, beginning on page 18. See also my pending work on Sharp’s rule for more on Wallace’s unfair review and treatment of Winer and others.

⁵⁵ For a discussion of Romans 9:5, see my Second Edition of *Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended*, Chapter 3, pages 143-152. See also my more recent discussion in, “Punctuation in Early Greek New Testament Texts,” *EOP* 3 (September 4, 2010 [revision date pending]), released in an earlier draft through my Blog *Watching the Ministry* (link: <http://elihubooks.blogspot.com/2010/09/punctuation-in-early-greek-new.html>). The fact is, however, no one is arguing that “God,” “the great God,” “God over all,” or even “Christ” or “Lord” *are* always proper names or, rather, that they *always* function as such. It depends on the context, the subjects involved, the events, other descriptions, and any other marks of identity which are provided, if any, as well as the author’s “habitual use of language.” Thus, while Wallace admits “Christ” is probably a proper name at times (see note 49, pages 17-18, for more on the use of “Christ” in Ephesians 5:5), it is not used as such elsewhere in the NT *when the context or when the speaker make the application plain*, as in Matthew 24:5. Justin Martyr provides some further evidence that “Christ” was considered a name perhaps only by some during his time. Justin wrote, “His Son ... is called Christ, in reference to His being anointed and God’s ordering all things through him; this name itself also containing an unknown significance” (from *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 1, page 190). Justin here contrasts the *name* “Christ” (Χριστός ... ὄνομα ... αὐτὸ) with terms such as “God,” “Creator,” and “Lord” which he does not view as “names” (οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν). Still, there is some uncertainty as to whether Justin views “Christ” as a name in the same sense as “Jesus,” to which Justin next refers. In making it known a second time that “‘God’ is not a name,” Justin prefaces his statement with a comparison between “God” and “Christ” using ὁν τρόπον (meaning “in the same way as”). This could mean “God” is not a proper “name” in the same way “Christ” is not a name like “Jesus” is a name, even though Justin clearly does also use ὄνομα in reference to “Christ.” See my chart on pages 390-392 of my Second Edition’s Excursus, and my note 96 on page 393 of the same, which show that while “God” alone may not always be a proper name, it does frequently serve as a semantic signal for the Father alone, as distinct from his Son, and so it also often serves as the equivalent of a proper name in the writings of Paul, Peter, and elsewhere in the NT.

⁵⁶ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 268-269; Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, pages 268-269.

Instead, Wallace claims that “in their zeal to defend the deity of Christ they [= the ‘early church fathers’] proved too much.”⁵⁷ Yet, nowhere in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* is there an attempt to “defend the deity of Christ”! There is an account of Christian martyrdom (hence, the title). There is also an issue of loyalty relating to Caesar and to Christ (8:2). But nowhere in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* is there anything which might lead to theological confusion, let alone a *misidentification* of the Father as the Holy Spirit!

Further in relation to this point, in his *Instructor* Clement of Alexandria speaks of Jesus as “the Son of God, the child of the Father,” and he writes about “the God and Father of our Lord Jesus,” teaching further as follows concerning them:

He [Jesus] proclaims His Father to be good, and *to be the Creator*. And that the Creator is just, is not disputed. And again he says, ‘My Father sends the rain on the just, and on the unjust.’ In respect of His sending rain, He is the Creator of the waters, and of the clouds. And in respect of His doing so on all, He holds an even balance justly and rightly. And as being good, he does so on just and unjust alike. ... Our Lord says in His prayer, ‘Our Father, who art in heaven.’ And the heavens belong to Him, who created the world. It is indisputable, then, that the Lord is the Son of the Creator; then the Lord is the Son of Him who is just.⁵⁸

Wallace also points out he is not saying such obvious distinctions are never made in the early church fathers, rather, “they are not consistently made.”⁵⁹ Yet, I have found nothing in the *Martyrdom of Polycarp* or in Clement of Alexandria’s writings which supports Wallace’s claim that such distinctions are “not consistently made.” Indeed, Wallace cites only one text from Ignatius (Ephesians 1:1), in which we read of “the blood of God.” But this does not expressly identify the Father with the Son.

A simple check of Ignatius’ “habitual use of language” shows he called Jesus “G-god,” but not a “*person*” of God where in this last expression “God” is the “one” Trinity, a *one what*.⁶⁰ Ignatius maintained a rather clear distinction between the Father and the Son, for he refers to “the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (ὁ πατήρ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ [Ephesians 2:1]), and he talks of singing “to the Father through Jesus Christ” (διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῷ πατρὶ [Ephesians 4:2]). Ignatius also speaks of those who are joined with God “as the Church is to Jesus Christ, and as Jesus Christ is to the Father” (ὡς ἡ ἐκκλησία Ἰησοῦ

⁵⁷ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 269; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 269.

⁵⁸ These translations are from the Eerdman’s reprint series of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 2, pages 215 and 227-228 (underlining added).

⁵⁹ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 270, note 266; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, page 269, note 108.

⁶⁰ According to James White, *The Forgotten Trinity: Recovering the Heart of Christian Belief* (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bethany, 1998), page 27, when speaking about the Trinity White believes it is correct for Trinitarians (including Wallace) to say that what is really being talked about is “one *what* and three *who*’s.” In other words:

The one *what* is the Being or essence of God; the three *who*’s are the Father, Son, and Spirit. We dare not mix up the *what*’s and *who*’s regarding the Trinity.

The above understanding of “God” as “one *what*” has nothing to do with the Bible or with any usage of the words for “G-god” in either the Old or the New Testaments. White’s comments above are cited and evaluated in my Second Edition (2000) of *Jehovah Witnesses Defended*, page 58 and following, as well as in my Third Edition (2009), page 134 and following.

Χριστῷ καὶ ὡς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τῷ πατρὶ [Ephesians 5:1]). More clear expressions of personal separation could hardly be made.

Wallace has misread and misrepresented the early church writings in question on this matter, all apparently so he can sustain the credibility of a “rule” which is broken several times in some of those very same writings (patristics). Wallace does cite W. Bousset who quotes Ignatius’ letter to the Ephesians 7.2 and his letter to Polycarp 3.2, but *neither* of these references say or teach anything about a “naïve modalism” (Bousset⁶¹). Yet, if they did, then it would mean *they did not know they were teaching it*. Therefore, these writings from the early church fathers could hardly have used a grammatical “rule” to express clearly a teaching that, according to Wallace and Bousset, they were not even sure they were writing about in the first place!

Both *Martyrdom of Polycarp* 22.1 and Clement of Alexandria’s *Paedagogus* 3.12 are exceptions to Sharp’s first rule, as is the following text from Justin Martyr which I also cited in my 2000 Excursus on Sharp’s rule (see pages 378-380), though Wallace (as with the exception to Sharp’s rule in 1 Timothy 6:13) nowhere discusses or even references this exception in his 2009 publication:

Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho*, 110.55.

ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄμπελος καὶ σωτῆρος Χριστοῦ
 (“... a vine [planted] by God and Savior Christ”).

Here Justin uses two nouns which have become proper names for Jesus, namely, “Savior Christ,” with “Savior” as the first term in the second part of a “Sharp’s rule” construction.⁶² Again, when “Savior” follows καὶ it is anarthrous as part of a clear exception to Sharp’s rule involving the terms “God” and “Christ,” and where only “God” has the article (compare Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1). Wallace ignores this text, though I cited it for him ten years ago!

I will discuss all of the above issues and more as it relates to Sharp’s *Canon and Its Kin* as presented over the years by Wallace and by others in my separate, pending publication on this subject. Now I will conclude this paper by presenting what I consider yet another exception to *Granville Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*:

Isidore of Pelusium, *Ep.* 2.143 (= *Ep.* 643 [Évieux]).

τὸ θεὸς καὶ κύριος
 (“God and Lord”).⁶³

⁶¹ Wilhelm Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, John E. Seely, trans. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), page 327.

⁶² The Greek text is from Migne. The fuller reading is, Ἡ γὰρ φυτευθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄμπελος καὶ σωτῆρος Χριστοῦ, ὁ λαὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστι. Here the pronoun (αὐτοῦ) which follows is singular, as in 2 Timothy 4:1, though speaking of both “God and Christ Jesus” (τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ [see the earlier discussion of the use of “Christ” as a proper name in texts such as Ephesians 5:5, in note 49 on page 17]).” The notion here of being such a “vine” rests and remains easily on the second named subject (“Savior Christ”), for the Father “sent” this one forth as “Savior of the world” (1 John 4:14) and those ‘planted by God and Savior Christ’ are “worshippers of God through the name Jesus,” which is Justin’s teaching just prior to the above cited subject text, right after which Justin writes about Jesus’ “second coming.” Therefore, it is also contextually appropriate for Justin to single out one of the two identified subjects for the continuation of his discussion, just as Paul does in 2 Timothy 4:1, and also likely why he/they placed the reference to “Savior Christ”/“Christ Jesus” second, rather than first, in the respective expressions.

⁶³ The Greek text is from Migne, and it is cited and translated by David T. Runia, “Philo of Alexandria in Five Letters of Isidore of Pelusium,” in *Earle Hilgert Festschrift: The Studia Philonica Annual* 3 (1991), pages 299, 301.

In this text from Isidore, in the same way Trinitarians today read post-biblical theology back into the NT where it concerns the meaning of biblical terms for “G-god,” Isidore here does basically the same thing when discussing Philo’s view of the expression, “God and Lord” (given above). Isidore claims that in the above expression Philo “gained a conception of the most royal (or highest) Trinity.” However, what Isidore is really reading and reinterpreting from Philo is just what Isidore next writes about, also from Philo (with my underlining and addition only of the bracketed comments):

He [Isidore is here speaking of (and for) Philo] declared that there were two [δύο] powers of Him that is, of which the one, he says, is the royal and punitive power and is called God (*theos*), the other is the royal and punitive power and is called Lord (*kurios*) ... Thus Philo too comes close to orthodox speaking about God. ... he did not confine his speaking about God to a single person.⁶⁴

Yet, Philo does not speak in terms of Trinitarianism but of “two powers” identified and differentiated expressly by the terms “Lord” and “God,” so that in the Greek expression, τὸ θεὸς καὶ κύριος, Isidore understood Philo “not [to be] speaking about ... a single person.” Therefore, whereas Wallace’s “‘Sharper’ rule” contends (with my bracketed comments added):

In native Greek constructions (i.e., not translation Greek), when a single article [“excluding ... indefinite pronouns functioning as articles before the second substantive” (Wallace’s 2009 qualification; see his note “2”)] modifies *two* substantives connected by καί (thus, article-substantive-καί-substantive), when both substantives are (1) singular (both grammatically and semantically), (2) personal, (3) and common nouns (not proper names or ordinals), they have the same referent.⁶⁵

The disputed texts aside, even the above revised version of Sharp’s rule (hence, Wallace refers to it as the “Sharper’ rule”) is contradicted by at least three non-NT but related texts (namely, Ignatius’ *Smyrnaeans* 9, Justin’s *Dialogue with Trypho*, 110.55, and the above text from Isidore) as well as by several NT texts including 2 Thessalonians 1:12, 1 Timothy 5:21, 6:13, 2 Timothy 4:1, and Ephesians 5:5, texts which have little to no significant difference with the frequently disputed NT texts (Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1), that is, when texts such as these are given their full, fair, and relevant consideration. Therefore, if Sharp’s rule does not apply to them because of the fixed nature or the “signification of the nouns” used, there are no good reasons for why Sharp’s rule should apply to the disputed texts which also contain some of the same (“God”) or very similar (“Savior”) nouns of significance, also with fixed applications (for examples, “the great God”; “Savior Jesus Christ”).

⁶⁴ Note Isidore’s rather elitist excuse in response to those who would ask, “‘Why were these doctrines [including the Trinity] not proclaimed clearly and explicitly from the very beginning?’ [M]y [Isidore’s] answer would be that both as demonstration and as teaching it *was* pellucidly clear to men of intelligence and understanding, as it was indeed to the wise Philo.” Yet, not in Philo, not in the Old Testament, and not in the New Testament is there any teaching which amounts to or that is consistent with Trinitarianism’s metaphysical understanding of “God” as one being or as a “one *what*” shared fully and equally by three “persons,” none of whom are individual “beings” separated by nature from the “one *what*.” Though Paul’s theology in 1 Corinthians 8:6 would not keep Jesus from being called “G-god” or even “the great God,” since as the “Son of God” he can be called “G-god” (compare Isaiah 9:6 and Jesus’ use of “gods,” “sons,” and “Son of God” in John 10:30-36), Trinitarianism’s understanding and use of the terms for “G-god” contradicts the use of the same terms in the biblical books and even in literature written during the same times (see my *Jehovah’s Witnesses Defended*, Third Edition, Chapter 2).

⁶⁵ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” page 279; Wallace, *Sharp’s Canon and Its Kin*, page 281.

The new exception from Isidore presented above contains elements that Wallace had previously (concerning 2 Thessalonians 1:12) indicated if present would allow “one [to] apply Sharp’s rule to this construction.”⁶⁶ Yet, in spite of the fact that Wallace is not accurate in his claim as it relates to the use of “Lord” with “Jesus Christ” in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 (see pages 14-16), if we follow Wallace’s view and “apply Sharp’s rule to the construction” here in Isidore, then Sharp’s rule and Wallace’s “‘Sharper’ rule” are broken yet again by a text which uses two of the very same terms (“God” and “Lord”) also involved in the dispute over the meaning of certain NT texts. This should not be too surprising, given the fixed nature or the “signification” of such nouns.

Sharp’s rule has failed to survive numerous evaluations, criticisms, and so it has been significantly revised by Wallace. Yet, Wallace’s “‘Sharper’ rule” has also failed to survive the presentation of responses, exceptions, and explanations given against the application of Sharp’s rule and the Sharper rule to various NT texts. In large part, where it concerns the disputed and other NT and other texts, Sharp and Wallace have failed to adequately evaluate them all, or to account for the usage of key terms in many of these same texts fairly, that is, according to the various authors’ “habitual use of language.”

In closing, I will give what is by a review of the best available evidence at this time *the sharpest rule* for use in translating Greek constructions which involve the syntax of Sharp’s first rule along with Wallace’s revisions to it. Though I will develop this further in my pending work on this subject, here I will provide a workable definition simply by adding the following qualification given long ago by Winstanley when writing about the exceptions to Sharp’s rule in Aristotle, but always before and still today true where it concerns the interpretation of nearly all if not, in fact, all nouns in a “Sharp’s rule” or “Sharper’ rule” construction in any writing of any Greek age or dialect:

[W]hen the signification of the nouns renders any farther precaution unnecessary, the second article may be omitted, without confounding the distinction of persons.⁶⁷

Such a qualification would not have to mean the article before nouns of “signification” is always omitted, or that inserting an article after a second, third, or more *καί*-joined noun necessarily separates the nouns.⁶⁸ As it always should be, the application of such nouns is a question of interpretation according to the best available evidence, of which syntactical patterns in Greek are just a part. The signification of the involved nouns and their use in association with other parts of speech or writing involved, including the author’s “habitual use of language,” should always be

⁶⁶ Wallace, “Multiple Substantives,” pages 246-247; Wallace, *Sharp's Canon and Its Kin*, pages 236-237.

⁶⁷ Winstanley, *Vindication*, page 9 (underlining added).

⁶⁸ See page 15, note 44, for a listing of NT texts which show that an article before the second of such nouns does *not* necessarily separate the two nouns, as Sharp wrongly claimed in his “Rule VI.,” which I will quote here from Sharp’s *Remarks*, page xxxvi:

RULE VI.

If they are connected by the copulative, and both have the article, they relate also to different persons.

However, Sharp (*Remarks*, page 14-15) even here notes that if “distinct and different actions are intended to be attributed to *one and the same person*; ... the context must explain or point out plainly the person to whom the two nouns relate” (underlining added), related to which is an example of a text which Sharp does not want broken by his own rule, namely, John 20:28 (see the First Edition [pages 202-206], Second Edition [pages 350-355], and Third Edition [pages 345-350] of my *Jehovah's Witnesses Defended* for a discussion of this text).

considered equally, if not more so, that is, relative to the weight of the evidence provided and pertaining to each subject text. Doing so will likely keep Greek grammarians and others from making up any more rules with so many clear exceptions and limitations according to a variety of different Greek texts and writers.

However, a proper approach to the interpretation of ancient texts will *not* likely keep Trinitarians from attempting to use Sharp's rule or the Sharper rule when interpreting several disputed, christologically significant NT texts, even if the interpretation advanced by those same Trinitarians contradicts the very doctrine Sharp's rule and the Sharper rule are used to try and further establish. As I will explain further in my pending publication *The "Sharpest Rule,"* it is precisely such attempted uses which make "Sharp's rule" Greek's most tragic grammatical rule.

APPENDIX

*Containing a December 27, 1995 Letter
From Greg Stafford to Dan Wallace*

Greg Stafford
18401 Carnaby Lane
Huntington Beach, CA 92648
December 27, 1995

Dan Wallace
Dallas Theological Seminary
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Dallas, TX 75204

Dear Dan:

I regret that a heavy schedule has delayed my sending you the material relating to the Granville Sharp controversy that we spoke of a couple weeks back. Are you in possession of the discussions which occurred in several issues of *The Monthly Review or Literary Journal*? If not, I will be glad to send them to you. There are a few matters I would like to discuss with you, particularly in regards to our brief discussion about the different arguments commonly presented against the validity of Sharp's rule.

During our phone conversation I asked what you thought of 1 Timothy 6:13 as an exception to Sharp's rule. You mentioned that you did consider it an exception, in so far as Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ is considered a proper name and would therefore not be an exception to the strict form of Sharp's rule. This would also, then, exclude 1 Timothy 5:21 from the strict-form category of Sharp's rule, as well as 2 Timothy 4:1 and perhaps Ephesians 5:5, also.

Another text where we appear to have all the requirements of Sharp's rule is 2 Thessalonians 1:12, κατὰ τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. According to Middleton, "Κύριος Ἰ. Χρ. is a common title of Christ, and is often used independently of all that precedes it," and, therefore, its occurrence in 2 Thessalonians 1:12 "affords no certain evidence in favor of Mr. Sharp." (*The Doctrine of the Greek Article*, 1833, 381-382) We can see that the writers of the New Testament were familiar with this collective title, and always omit the article when it follows καί. (Rom. 1:7; 15:6; 1 Cor. 1:3; 2 Cor. 1:2; Gal. 1:3; Eph. 1:2; 6:23; Phil. 1:2; 1 Thess. 1:1; 2 Thess. 1:1-2; Phm. 1:3; James 1:1; Jude 4) Yet, when used in non-καί constructions, Κύριος Ἰ. Χρ. is always articulated. (Acts 15:26; 28:31; Rom. 5:1; 5:11; 15:30; 1 Cor. 1:2, 7-8, 10; 6:11; 15:57; 2 Cor. 1:3; 8:9; 13:13; Gal. 6:14, 18; Eph. 1:3, 17; 5:20; Phil. 4:23; Col. 1:3; 1 Thess. 1:3; 5:9, 23, 28; 2 Thess. 1:12; 2:1, 14; 3:6, 18; 1 Tim. 6:3, 14; Phm. 1:25; James 2:1; 1 Peter 1:3; 2 Peter 1:8, 16; Jude 1:17; 1:21) The only exception appears to be 2 Thessalonians 3:12, ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ.

The New Testament use of Χριστός, Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦ, or Κύριος Ἰ. Χρ. as equivalents of proper names seems to indicate why, when used in article+noun+καί+noun constructions, or even in noun+καί+noun constructions (e.g., 2 Thess. 1:2), these titles lack the article. Perhaps this is why Robertson is hesitant to apply Sharp's rule to 2 Thessalonians 1:12 and Ephesians 5:5. (large Grammar, p. 786) I am curious, though, why the same could not be true of σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ., since, as Alford points out, "σωτήρ was one of those words which gradually dropped the

article and became a quasi proper name." (*The Greek Testament*, Vol. 3, p. 420) Perhaps this is why in BDF (§ 276 (3)) we read, "σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ. may be taken by itself and separated from the preceding."

In answer to this observation, which is also made by Winstanely (*Vindication*, 1819, pp. 49-50), I gather from our conversation that you would posit that we never find examples of article+noun+καί+proper name (or collective title with the force of a proper name) constructions where *both* the noun and proper name apply to the *same* person, and since we have several examples in 2 Peter (1:11; 2:20; 3:18) of this construction which undeniably apply both nouns to the same person, σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ. could not be considered a proper name. However, I believe that rather than being proof that σωτήρος Ἰ. Χρ. is not the equivalent of a proper name, and, therefore, not to be placed in the same category as the constructions found in 2 Thessalonians 1:12, 1 Timothy 5:21; 6:13, and 2 Timothy 4:1, that these constructions in 2 Peter show that article+noun+καί+proper name constructions can be applied to *one* person. The validity of this conclusion is also revealed in Jude 4, where the best authorities read, τὸν μόνον δεσπότην καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν. This text surely affords us an example of an article+noun+καί+proper name construction where both the first noun and the proper name equivalent apply to the same person.

So, it seems to me that the "antecedent probability" you refer to in your article, "The Article-Noun-καί-Noun Plural Construction" (*Grace Theological Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 71), is bit more restricted than you suggest when the scope of investigation is limited to those constructions wherein we find the second καί-joined noun to be the equivalent of a proper name. The conclusions we can draw by examining these constructions is that sometimes both the first noun and proper name (or equivalent) are applied to the same person (2 Peter 1:11; 2:20; 3:18; Jude 4), and sometimes they are not (2 Thess. 1:12; 1 Tim. 5:21; 6:13; 2 Tim. 4:1). The question, then, that must be answered, is how do we know when both noun and proper name equivalent are applied to the same person and when they are applied to different persons? And, more to the point, how do we make such a determination in such theologically significant passages as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1? I believe, as you point out in note 25, page 71, of your article on the plural constructions, that arguments presented for either conclusion "must be based on other than syntax," even as Stuart seemed to realize. ("Hints and Cautions Respecting the Greek Article," *Biblical Repository*, 1834, Vol. 4, No. 14, pp. 322-325) We must determine whether the context in article+noun+καί+proper name constructions allows for one or two individuals to be in view. Allow me to present a brief synopsis of the contextual arguments which seem to favor those translations which see two persons referred to in texts such as Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1.

The contextual considerations which I would present in favor of a rendering which does not identify τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ as one and the same as σωτήρος ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ. start with the same considerations Winer was cautioned by: Would Paul (assuming Paul, as I believe, wrote Titus) refer to Jesus as "the great God" when elsewhere (excluding, for the time being, the disputed reference in Romans 9:5, and the reference to Satan in 2 Cor. 4:4) his use of θεός is used exclusively of the Father? Additionally, would he call Jesus "the great God" when elsewhere he says, "for us there is one God, the Father"? (1 Cor. 8:6) What about his reference to the "one God" in 1 Timothy 2:5, where the "one God" is shown in the very same verse to be distinct

from Christ Jesus? How could Paul in Titus 2:13 refer to Jesus as "the great God," when over and over again he makes reference to ὁ θεὸς τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ? (Eph. 1:17; see also, Rom. 15:6; 2 Cor. 1:3; 11:31; Eph. 1:3) Of course, I am not suggesting that Paul could not have referred to Christ as "the great God" with some lesser connotation, but I cannot see how he could have referred to Christ in an unqualified sense as θεός, given the above cited references to the Father as the "one God" of Christians, and in view of his references to this One God being the God of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Also in favor of a two-subject rendering of Titus 2:13 is the fact that τὴν μακαρίαν ἐλπίδα καὶ ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης, as noted by Abbot ("On The Construction of Titus ii. 13," JBL, Vol. 1, 1881, pp. 4-6), is in perfect accord with Jesus' statement recorded in Matthew 16:27 and Mark 8:38, which indicates that the Lord's coming would be a manifestation of *both* his glory and his Father's. See also the comments of E. F. Scott on page 169 of *The Pastoral Epistles*, in the Moffatt New Testament Commentary series, on this point.

Regarding 2 Peter 1:1, I believe we have even greater reason to conclude that τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ is a reference to two individuals, not one. Not only do we have a reference to ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1 Peter 1:3), but, in 2 Peter 1:2 we have a clear reference to God and Jesus as distinct individuals. Still, these facts aside, I think there is additional reason to see a reference to two individuals in 2 Peter 1:1, and that reason is found in 2 Peter 1:11, 2:20, and 3:18; verses which are typically used to defend a rendering that makes "God" and "Savior" two titles for Jesus Christ. Let us place them before us so that the difference between these verses and 2 Peter 1:1 becomes manifest.

2PE 1:1 τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

2PE 1:11 τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

2PE 2:20 τοῦ κυρίου [ἡμῶν] καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

2PE 3:18 τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.


Now, don't you find it a bit unusual that Peter (assuming, as I believe, that Peter wrote 2 Peter) would use this construction to refer to Jesus as θεός in 2 Peter 1:1, and then when he employs this same construction another three times throughout his second letter he chooses an entirely different title? I do. Especially since he, in addition to the above, refers to Christ as κύριος at 1 Peter 1:3, 2:3, 2:13, 3:15, 2 Peter 1:2, 8, 14, 16, and 3:2, a total of 12 times. Yet, nowhere else does he use θεός of Jesus. Still, in spite of that fact, and Peter's significant statement at 1 Peter 1:3, the distinction he makes between God and Jesus in 2 Peter 1:2, and his preference for predicating κύριος of Jesus and θεός of the Father, which he does 45 times if we exclude 2 Peter 1:1 (1 Peter 1:2-3, 5, 21 (twice), 23; 2:4-5, 10, 12, 15-17, 19-20, 3:4-5, 17-18, 20-22; 4:2, 6, 10-11 (three times), 14, 16-17 (twice), 19; 5:2 (twice), 5-6, 10, 12; 2 Peter 1:2, 17, 21; 2:4, 3:5, 12), we are told that he broke from his preference of calling Jesus κύριος and, instead, gave him the title that he elsewhere uses exclusively of the Father? The evidence for such a conclusion, which rests solely on the absence of the article before σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ

Χριστοῦ, appears very slim when these facts are given due consideration. Of course, we should not overlook the fact that the repetition of the article before the second noun would not necessarily indicate a reference to two individuals anyway, as the constructions in John 13:13 and 2 John 7 reveal.

I know you must have a heavy schedule, but I would be curious to know what contextual arguments you think would support a translation that makes θεός a predicate of Jesus in Titus 2:13 and 2 Peter 1:1, as well as any thoughts you have on the above information. Also, if your schedule allows, I would greatly appreciate having a copy of C. Kuehne's articles in the *Journal of Theology* 13(3, 4), 14(1, 2, 3, 4), and 15(1, 2). I would be happy to reimburse you for any expenses you incur in sending me these articles, should your schedule allow it.

With thanks for your giving consideration to these matters, I remain,

Yours sincerely,



Greg Stafford